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ABSTRACT 
Rates of illegal immigration recidivism by previously convicted and removed 
noncitizens—criminal immigration recidivists—are disconcerting. Enforcement 
strategies such as prosecution and removals do not appear to prevent and deter 
this population’s reoffending behavior as much as expected. Meanwhile, 
resources are continually strained—at the taxpayers’ expense—due to re-
enforcement of immigration, criminal, and other laws.  
As a result, this thesis argues in favor of introducing civil restitution (CR) 
as an enforcement strategy against criminal immigration recidivism. In support of 
this argument, the author employed a hybrid experimental and causal design 
methodology to research the history of restitution as an alternative sanction in the 
criminal justice system. The feasibility of developing a strategy against criminal 
immigration recidivism modeled after restitution’s theoretical underpinnings was 
explored and tested. 
The CR strategy borrows from restitution’s focus on holding offenders 
accountable for the financial losses their offenses have caused to their victims, 
and, as per the research findings, its potential to lower recidivism rates, thereby 
reducing the costs of re-enforcing or reinitiating the removal process at the 
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) expense. 
The thesis concludes by recommending the implementation of a CR policy 
model strategy. The strategy will become part of the DHS Mission 3’s “prevention 
of unlawful immigration” goals and objectives.  
 v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT ..................................................................... 9 
1. Interventions: Prosecutions and Removals ........................ 11 
2. Criminal Immigration Recidivists in the Federal Justice 
System .................................................................................... 12 
3. Immigration Law Violators .................................................... 16 
4. Expenditures on Enforcement .............................................. 18 
a. Statistical and Other Limitations ............................... 19 
B. HYPOTHESIS: CIVIL RESTITUTION AS A STRATEGIC TOOL 
TO LIMIT CRIMINAL IMMIGRATION RECIDIVISM .......................... 22 
C. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY ............................................................... 23 
1. Burden on Society ................................................................. 23 
2. The Need for Alternatives ..................................................... 24 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................. 25 
E. OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS ......................................... 25 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................ 27 
A. RESTITUTION TO DETER RECIDIVISM ........................................... 27 
1. Civil vs. Criminal Restitution ................................................ 27 
2. Criminal Justice Enforcement vs. Immigration 
Enforcement ........................................................................... 27 
3. Restorative Justice ................................................................ 28 
B. RESTITUTION AS EFFECTIVE ......................................................... 29 
C. RESTITUTION AS NOT EFFECTIVE ................................................ 30 
D. MIXED RESULTS STUDIES .............................................................. 31 
E. LITERATURE LIMITATIONS ............................................................. 33 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................................................... 35 
A. EXPLORATORY RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................ 36 
B. CAUSAL RESEARCH DESIGN ......................................................... 38 
1. Target Sample Population..................................................... 39 
2. Control Population Sample Characteristics ........................ 40 
3. Intervention ............................................................................ 40 
4. Comparison ............................................................................ 41 
C. RESULTS ........................................................................................... 41 
D. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH DESIGN ........................................... 55 
IV. POLICY DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................. 57 
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS ..................................................................... 57 
1. Expected Findings ................................................................. 59 
2. Surprising Findings ............................................................... 60 
B. CURRENT PRACTICE AND LIMITATIONS ...................................... 61 
C. MODEL DEVELOPMENT .................................................................. 65 
D. DETAILS ............................................................................................ 68 
 vii 
E. SELECTION AND ELIGIBILITY......................................................... 69 
F. PILOT PROGRAM: IMPLEMENTING CIVIL RESTITUTION ............. 70 
1. Preliminary Procedures ........................................................ 70 
2. Civil Restitution Awards ....................................................... 71 
3. Travel and Notification Procedures ..................................... 71 
4. Conditions .............................................................................. 72 
5. Information Sharing: Data Transmission, Quality, and 
Integrity .................................................................................. 73 
6. Costs ....................................................................................... 75 
7. Outcome Measures: Collaborative Oversight ..................... 75 
G. ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGES ............................................ 77 
1. Possible Advantages ............................................................. 80 
2. Possible Risks ....................................................................... 81 
H. POSSIBLE STAKEHOLDER OBJECTIONS: MODEL 
TRADEOFFS ..................................................................................... 84 
1. The Public............................................................................... 84 
2. DHS Law Enforcement Personnel ........................................ 85 
3. Detention Facilities ................................................................ 85 
4. NGOs ...................................................................................... 86 
5. International Carriers ............................................................ 89 
6. Legitimate and Clandestine Agendas .................................. 90 
a. Foreign Governments ................................................. 90 
b. Immigration Attorneys ................................................ 91 
c. Criminal Organizations/Enterprises .......................... 91 
V. FUTURE OUTLOOK ..................................................................................... 93 
A. IMPLICATIONS .................................................................................. 94 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................................................ 96 
1. Terrorists and Immigration Recidivism ............................... 96 
2. Interventions .......................................................................... 97 
3. Conclusion ............................................................................. 98 
APPENDIX A. LIST OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES ELIGIBLE FOR IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTION ............................................................................ 99 
APPENDIX B. DEFINITION OF KEY IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT TERMS . 101 
APPENDIX C. AMOUNT AND PERCENT OF OFFENDERS RECEIVING 
RESTITUTION AS A SOLE SANCTION OR IN COMBINATION IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURT ...................................................................................... 103 
LIST OF REFERENCES ........................................................................................ 105 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................... 113 
 
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws, 
“Prevention of Unlawful Immigration,” Goals and Objectives: An 
Overview .............................................................................................. 4 
Figure 2. FY 2012 Total Removal Data by Priorities. Immigration Recidivists 
(Priority III) Represent the Second Largest Proportion of Removals 
Although Not the Highest Priority for Enforcement. .............................. 9 
Figure 3. Overview of Federal Criminal Cases FY 2012. ................................... 16 
Figure 4. FY 2008–FY 2012 Total Removal Data by Priority. ............................ 18 
Figure 5. Differences and Similarities Between Immigration Violators and 
Criminal Immigration Recidivists......................................................... 20 
Figure 6. FY 2013 Interior Removal Data by Priority. ........................................ 22 
Figure 7. Basic Overview of the Immigration Enforcement Process for Most 
First Time Offenders. Criminal Immigration Recidivists Have Their 
Original Removal Orders Re-instated, and Do Not Undergo This 
Process Anew. ................................................................................... 42 
Figure 8. The U.S. Federal Criminal Justice Process, a Basic Overview. ......... 43 
Figure 9. FY 2008 New Prosecutions for Criminal Recidivists in the Districts 
of Arizona Southern California, and Southern Texas.......................... 45 
Figure 10. Noncitizens Incarcerated in Federal Prison, by Offence Type, 
1985–2010. ........................................................................................ 46 
Figure 11. Imprisonment Rates of Offenders Eligible for Non-Prison Sentences 
in Selected Offense Types, FY 2012. ................................................. 52 
Figure 12. Restitution Collections Nationwide FY 2004–FY 2010. ...................... 53 
Figure 13. USAOs FY2011 Criminal Case Workload. ......................................... 62 
Figure 14. USAOs Restitution Collections FY 2004 to FY 2011. ......................... 65 
Figure 15. Mission 3’s CR Pilot Program Model Overview. ................................. 70 
Figure 16. Mission 3 Proposed CR Implementation Model. ................................. 74 
 
 ix 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, 
Detention, and Removal of Aliens. Priority I, Levels 1–2 Offenders 
Are a Top Enforcement Priority. ........................................................... 8 
Table 2. Trends in Immigration Prosecutions for Illegal Re-entry. .................... 12 
Table 3. Percentage of Criminal Immigration Recidivists by Criminal History 
Category (and Applicable Points) Based on Prior Sentence Length. . 15 
Table 4. FY 2013 Interior Removal Data by Priority. ........................................ 22 
Table 5. Top Five Districts Illegal Re-entry Offenders FY 2012........................ 44 
Table 6. District of Arizona, FY 2012 Guideline Sentences. ............................. 47 
Table 7. District of Southern California, FY 2012 Guideline Sentences. .......... 48 
Table 8. District of New Mexico, FY 2012 Guideline Sentences. ...................... 49 
Table 9. District of Texas Southern, FY 2012 Guideline Sentences. ................ 50 
Table 10. District of Texas Western, FY 2012 Guideline Sentences. ................. 51 
Table 11. Percent of Offenders Returning to Federal Prison within Three 
Years of Release by Type of Offense at Release, and Return, 
2008. .................................................................................................. 54 
Table 12. List of Criminal Offenses Eligible for Immigration Enforcement 
Action ................................................................................................. 99 
Table 13. Amount and Percent of Offenders Receiving Restitution As a Sole 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ABA   American Bar Association 
ACLU   American Civil Liberties Union 
ATF   Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
AUSO   Attorneys Office 
 
BJS   Bureau of Justice Statistics 
BMIS Web   Bond Management Information System-Web  
BOP   Bureau of Prisons 
 
CBP    Customs and Border Protection 
CDCS   Consolidated Debt Collection System 
CHDS   Homeland Defense and Security  
CFR    Code of Federal Regulations 
CR   civil restitution 
CRS   Congressional Research Service 
 
DACA   Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival  
DEA   Drug Enforcement Administration 
DHS   Department of Homeland Security 
DOJ   Department of Justice 
DOS    Department of State  
 
EARM   ENFORCE Alien Removal Module 
eBONDS   Bonds Online System  
ERO   Enforcement and Removal Operations 
 
FBI   Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FLU   Financial Litigation Unit 
 
GAO    Government Accountability Office  
 
HRF   Human Rights First 
 
ICE   Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
IIRIRA   Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
IJ    Immigration Judge 
INA    Immigration and Nationality Act  
 
JPI   Justice Policy Institute 
 
LII    Legal Information Institute 
LPR    Legal Permanent Resident 
 xiii 
MPI   Migration Policy Institute 
MVRA   Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 
 
NCJRS  National Criminal Justice Reference Service 
NGO   Non-governmental Organizations 
NIF   National Immigration Forum 
NIJ   National Institute of Justice 
NPS   Naval Postgraduate School 
 
OAS    Organization of American States 
OIG   Office of Inspector General 
OIS   Office of Immigration Statistics 
OJJDP  Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention 
OJP   Office of Justice Programs 
OVC   Office of Victims of Crime 
 
STU    Statistical Tracking Unit  
 
TRAC   Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
 
UNHRC   United Nations Human Rights Commission  
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
U.S.   United States 
U.S.C.  United States Code  
USC    University of Southern California 
USAO   United States Attorneys Office 
USMS   United States Marshal Service 
USSC   United States Sentencing Commission 
USSS United States Secret Service 
 
VWPA  Victim Witness Protection Act  
 
WRC    Women’s Refugee Commission 
 xiv 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Mission 3: Enforcing and 
Administering Our Immigration Laws’ goals and objectives include the 
“prevention of unlawful immigration.” As a result, Mission 3 enforcement 
strategies focus on arresting, detaining, prosecuting, and removing repeat 
immigration violators;1 the most dangerous criminals (i.e., those who pose a 
threat to this country’s national security and public safety; human rights violators; 
fugitives), and the like. Prosecutions and subsequent removal are used as 
enforcement tools against repeat immigration violators. 
Repeat immigration violators include non-citizens2 who repeatedly re-
enter the United States (U.S.) without previous authorization after prior removal 
or deportation. A history of violent and non-violent criminal behavior (convictions) 
prior to, or after illegal re-entry, aggravates this immigration offense. Although 
immigration violators include non-criminal persons, those with a history of violent 
and non-violent criminal behavior are the focus of this thesis. Throughout this 
document, they are referred to as “criminal immigration recidivists,”3 and their 
history of repeat immigration violations or behavior, as “criminal immigration 
recidivism.” 
1 Throughout this thesis, the author used “DHS” instead of the name of the enforcement 
component (s); the focus is not agency, but Mission 3-specific. DHS defines “repeat and 
egregious” immigration law violators, and immigration fugitives as individuals who return to this 
country after having been previously removed, those who engage in immigration fraud, and those 
who flagrantly ignore an immigration court's order to leave the country. U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal 
Operations, “Removal Statistics,” April 1, 2013, http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/. 
2 Throughout the paper, and due to the author’s preference, the term “non-citizen” replaces 
the term alien. The term “alien” is used only when citing policy. In immigration law, the term alien 
refers to non-citizens (legal and illegal or undocumented). Legal Information Institute, “Rights, 
Privileges, and Duties of Aliens,” Cornell University Law School, November 16, 2012, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alien.  
3 The author refers to repeat immigration violators without a criminal history simply as 
“immigration recidivists.” 
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Rates of immigration recidivism are confounding. Prosecutions for 
immigration violations provide temporary incapacitation4 of further criminal 
behavior within this population, but do not seem to affect the underlying behavior 
as much as expected. In fiscal year (FY) 2011 alone, the United States Attorneys 
Office filed 28, 806 cases involving immigration offenses. Other crimes involving 
non-citizens included drugs (15,213), violent crimes (11,885), white-collar crimes 
(6,516), and, others (6,536).5 The average sentence length for immigration 
recidivists (criminal and non-criminal) ranges between 16 and 10 months, 
respectively.6 However, according to a Bureau of Justice Statistics report7 about 
immigration offenders in the federal justice system published in 2012, defendants 
charged with illegal re-entry were more likely to have a prior conviction (85 
percent).8  
Removal from the United States represents “finality” since the non-citizen 
is no longer a threat to the community; however, removal numbers continue to 
increase. For FY 2013, DHS removal statistics estimate the number of removed 
4 Incapacitation refers to the effect of a sanction to stop people from committing crime by 
removing [an] offender from the community. U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of 
Justice, “Topics: Corrections. Recidivism: Core Concerns,” November 14, 2012, http://www.nij. 
gov/nij/topics/corrections/recidivism/core-concern.htm. 
5 U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorneys FY 2013 Performance Budget 
Congressional Submission (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, United States 
Attorney’s Office), February 11, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy 
13-usa-justification.pdf. 
6 United States Sentencing Commission, “Sentence Length in Each Primary Offense 
Category, United States Sentencing Commission’s 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing 
Statistics—Table 13 (Online),” June 14, 2013, http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/ 
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/Table13.pdf. 
7 The full study is available from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Federal Justice Statistics Program, Immigration Offenders in the 




                                            
repeat immigration violators at 159,624.9 For FY 2012, the number of recidivists 
removed was estimated at 149,000.10  
Re-enforcement costs provide yet another perspective on this issue. A 
2013 report published by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) indicated that the 
U.S. government spends more on immigration related enforcement than on all its 
criminal federal law enforcement agencies combined.11 The DHS immigration 
enforcement budget for FY 2012 was approximately $18 billion, exceeding by 
almost 24 percent total spending by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), 
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Secret Service 
(USSS), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the 
U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).12 Moreover, the DHS FY 2012 Budget 
Justification show the department’s intended plans for detention expansion: “By 
adding 600 beds to the administration’s request, Congress’s enacted budget 
added expenditures of $27 to $36 million.”13  
Depending on how these statistics are interpreted, enforcement tools, 
such as prosecution and removals, are producing outstanding results; or, the 
criminal immigration recidivism problem is in need of a new or additional strategic 
approach. The author has chosen the latter interpretation. 
9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate, 
Immigration Enforcement Actions: FY 2012 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate, December 2013). Note that the author 
did not use “criminal immigration recidivist” to cite FY 12–13 figures, as the report containing the 
data does not make this distinction clear.  
10 Written Testimony of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Executive Associate 
Director Thomas Homan for a House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
Subcommittee on National Security Hearing Titled “Border Security Oversight: Identifying and 
Responding to Current Threats, 113th Cong., 1st sess. (June 26, 2013).  
11 Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery 
(Washington, DC: The Migration Policy Institute, January 2013), 37, http://www.migrationpolicy. 
org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidable-machinery. 
12 Ibid. 
13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Congressional Budget Justification: Salaries and 
Expenses FY 2012 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011), http://www. 
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-congressional-budget-justification-fy2012.pdf.  
 xvii 
                                            
Criminal immigration recidivism statistics are demoralizing, but do not 
seem to raise the alarm to the problem loud enough. Criminal immigration 
recidivists have been assigned the lowest category for enforcement; perhaps, the 
data fails to paint the entire picture about the extent of the problem. In other 
words, although recidivism rates are high, as are re-enforcement costs, the 
problem is not as critical to national security as to necessitate a higher priority; 
possibly a valid argument. At first glance, however, the statistics serve to provide 
a general overview on how resources are continually drained over the same 
offenders. 
If rates of criminal immigration recidivism are not as critical to national 
security at the moment, but resources are being taxed within this population 
anyways, why not do something about it now before the situation turns into a 
critical incident? If a new strategic plan has the potential to offset some of the 
financial burden on the American taxpayers, while potentially reducing recidivism 
within this group, why explore its advantages and disadvantages in greater 
detail? The author is recommending developing and implementing a civil 
restitution (CR) policy model as one of Mission 3’s Prevention of Unlawful 
Immigration goals and objectives.  
CR would serve as an intervention or enforcement strategy, in lieu of or as 
an alternative to prosecution against criminal immigration recidivists. CR would 
grant to DHS the authority to demand and collect reimbursement from criminal 
immigration recidivists, for the costs of re-enforcing or reinitiating the removal 
process at its expense. The offender’s reimbursement would mainly cover 
detention and transportation costs to the country of origin. CR would grant to 
DHS the authority to act on behalf of the “victims” (i.e., the American taxpayers) 
who are the parties directly affected or burdened by repeated immigration 
enforcement costs.  
 xviii 
 APPROACH 
In support of implementing CR as an enforcement strategy within Mission 
3 against criminal immigration recidivism, the author employed a hybrid 
experimental and causal design methodology. She first researched the history of 
restitution as an alternative sanction in the criminal justice system, and then 
explored the feasibility of developing a strategy against criminal immigration 
recidivism modeled after restitution’s theoretical underpinnings. The CR strategy 
borrows from restitution’s focus on holding offenders accountable for the financial 
losses their offenses have caused to their victims, and its potential cost-savings 
due to lower recidivism rates. She researched the literature on restitution, which 
included experimental, and meta-analysis research studies on its effects in 
deterring criminal re-offending.  
Secondly, she studied the offenses most likely to receive restitution as a 
sentencing option in the federal system. The goal was to identify whether 
restitution is applied in immigration cases, or the likelihood that an immigration 
offender would receive an order of restitution as a sentencing option. 
She also researched the top five immigration recidivists’ prosecuting 
districts in the nation. The District of Arizona, the Southern Districts of California, 
the District of New Mexico, and the Southern and Western District of Texas 
represent the top five districts for illegal re-entry cases prosecutions for 2012.14 
The goal was to identify the feasibility of deploying a CR implementation pilot 
based on the current application of restitution in repeat immigration violation 
cases, if at all imposed.  
 RESULTS 
The research showed that, when compared to other approaches against 
criminal behavior, restitution is effective in reducing recidivism or the likelihood of 
reoffending. Operational costs were thereby reduced, as seen in Randy Barnett, 
14 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts (Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission), 1–2. 
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“Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice”; Gail Caputo, Intermediate 
Sanctions in Corrections in chapter 15); Jeff Latimer, Craig Dowden, and 
Danielle Muise, “The Effectiveness of Restorative Justice Practices: A Meta-
Analysis”; R. Barry Ruback and Mark H. Bergstrom, “Economic Sanctions in 
Criminal Justice: Purposes, Effects, and Implications”; Alison, Cares, Stacy 
Hoskins, and R. Barry Ruback, “Economic Sanctions and Recidivism”; Yvon 
Dandurand and Curt T. Griffiths, “Handbook on Restorative Justice 
Programmes”; Crime Victims Institute in 2006; National Institute of Justice in 
2007; National Center for Victims of Crime, “Making Restitution Real: Five Case 
Studies on Improving Restitution Collection”; Vivienne Chin, “Introductory 
Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of 
Offenders”; and others. This reduction is particularly the case when restitution is 
used as an alternative sentencing option in juvenile criminal and delinquent 
populations, as seen in Anne L. Schneider and Peter R. Schneider, “The Impact 
of Restitution on Recidivism of Juvenile Offenders: An Experiment in Clayton 
County, Georgia”; and Laurie Ervin and Anne Schneider, “Explaining the Effects 
of Restitution on Offenders: Results from a National Experiment in Juvenile 
Courts.”  
The United States Sentencing Commission data showed that restitution is 
currently imposed in federal immigration cases, albeit in a minimal or small 
percentage of all cases. Therefore, implementing a scheme modeled after 
restitution, such as CR, is feasible. 
 IMPLICATIONS 
The research findings suggest that the feasibility exists for implementing a 
CR Policy Model within Mission 3’s “prevention of unlawful immigration” goals 
and objectives against criminal immigration recidivists. As a result, certain 
implications follow from this recommendation. 
• If CR implementation is successful, the main difference it will make 
is to shift the fiscal burden of reinforcement from the taxpayer to the 
recidivist.  
 xx 
• The success of this intervention will be determined by factors, such 
as the long-term financial impact brought upon the criminal 
immigration recidivist, the accompanying psychological effects 
towards desistance, and the offenders’ ability, willingness, and 
desire to comply with the CR agreement in lieu of risking 
prosecution.  
• A CR pilot program should be implemented for no less than two 
years. It should begin with the non-violent criminal immigration 
recidivists as the primary target population to aid adaptation of this 
somewhat radical method of enforcement.  
• The two-year period calculation is estimated to provide enough 
data to assess CR’s full applicability and effectiveness, and allow 
for iterations accordingly. The 1975 Georgia’s Restitution Center 
Program, and the 1977 Georgia’s Non-Residential Sole Sanction 
Restitution Program15 could serve as comprehensive blueprints on 
how to make adjustments during the pilot program.  
• If the pilot period is a success, and preliminary data shows CR’s 
effectiveness as a tool against criminal immigration recidivism, the 
next challenge will be to implement it across the other category of 
criminal immigration recidivists (i.e., the violent population). 
Implementing CR within the violent criminal immigration recidivist 
population will not only challenge traditional enforcement strategies, 
but also its success will also serve to refocus Mission 3’s goals and 
objectives drastically. 
• Another challenge will be determining whether to impose CR as a 
one-time option, in addition to, in lieu of prosecution, and how many 
times, re-applying CR would have to be decided based on metrics’ 
results throughout and after the pilot period.  
• The decision to re-grant CR, and if so, how many times, instead of 
opting for prosecution, will be very challenging. Granting CR in 
multiple instances will diminish one of the purposes behind the 
strategy, i.e., lowering criminal immigration recidivism. However, if 
the general attitude remains that criminal immigration recidivism is 
not a critical national security issue, at least the taxpayers will not 
be burdened with the costs of reinforcement. Regardless, this 
decision will necessitate strong leadership, advocacy, and bi-
partisan collaboration, as the nation’s risk-tolerance will be tested.  
15 For a description of these programs, see Bill Read, Restitution As it Meets Public 
Expectations in Georgia’s Restitution Programs (Atlanta, GA: American Correctional Association 
Congress, 1977), Office of Justice Programs, National Criminal Justice Reference Service: NCJ 
045621, May 18, 2013, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/45621NCJRS.pdf. 
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• Whether DHS and policy-makers reconsider the priority currently 
given to criminal immigration recidivists or not, at least this 
management or strategic approach may serve to open the subject 
to future research. According to the National Criminal Justice 
Reference Service (NCJRS), “Despite the passage of federal and 
state legislation, restitution remains one of the most under enforced 
and underused alternative sanction [emphasis added]. Evidence of 
this is apparent both in decisions to order restitution and in efforts 
to monitor, collect, and disperse restitution payments…”16  
 CONCLUSION 
This thesis does not claim to be the solution to the criminal immigration 
recidivism problem, just a different management approach.  
CR is not a benefit or relief from removal, and must be understood in this 
manner. CR in no way provides impunity to criminal immigration recidivists. The 
best way to understand CR’s goals and objectives is to interpret it as a form of 
prosecutorial discretion, but with a focus on “benefiting” the American taxpayer, 
not “rewarding” the offender. CR is an enforcement strategy geared towards 
desistance of criminal immigration recidivism from a financial accountability, 
rather than from a pure “punitive” perspective.  
Implementing a CR pilot within the top five prosecution districts may be 
the most commonsensical approach to testing the strategy. Piloting CR in these 
regions will provide reliable statistical outcome measures regarding the strategy’s 
effect on criminal immigration recidivism rates. 
CR’s goal is to apply an unconventional management approach to a 
persistent threat, i.e., criminal immigration recidivism. CR strikes a balance 
between the need to tend to this matter, and the need for well-developed, and 
ethical strategies. The CR strategy is meant to strengthen Mission 3’s 
“prevention of unlawful immigration” goals and objectives; thereby, furthering 
DHS homeland security principles.  
16 The National Criminal Justice Reference Service, “New Directions from the Field: 
Restitution,” Chapter 15, (archives), January 29, 2013, https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/ 
directions/pdftxt/chap15.txt. 
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Since its creation in 2002, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) has worked toward achieving its core missions, goals, and objectives. 
DHS five core homeland security areas are Mission 1) prevent terrorism and 
enhance security; Mission 2) secure and manage our borders; Mission 3) enforce 
and administer our immigration laws; Mission 4) safeguard and secure 
cyberspace; and Mission 5) ensure resilience to disasters.1 Although equally 
important, these missions have encountered a myriad of domestic and global 
challenges that have, at times, dictated their priority. Illegal immigration and 
border security are current and relevant examples within DHS Mission 3 (Mission 
3).  
DHS mission goals and objectives are to prevent, protect, respond, 
recover, build and strengthen security, develop resilience to disasters, and 
facilitate trade.2 This thesis specifically focuses on Mission 3’s goal to “prevent 
unlawful immigration.”3 The Black’s Law Online Dictionary defines “unlawful” as: 
“That which is contrary to law; ‘unlawful’ and ‘illegal’ are frequently used as 
synonymous terms, but, in the proper sense of the word, ‘unlawful,’ denotes acts 
which, although not illegal (i.e., positively forbidden) are disapproved of by the 
law, and are therefore not recognized as the ground of legal rights, either 
because they are immoral or because they are against public policy.”4 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 grants to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security the responsibility for establishing national immigration enforcement 
policies, priorities, and administering the lawful immigration system to include 
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010), x. (from hereon referred to as 
QHSR 2010). 
2 Ibid., 37. 
3 Ibid., 50–53. 
4 The Black’s Law Online Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v, “Unlawful,” September 11, 2013, 
http://thelawdictionary.org/unlawful/. [Emphasis added.] 
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establishing and administering rules governing the granting of visas, refugee, and 
asylum or other forms of permission to enter the United States.5 The strategic 
approach to balance, and achieve, these responsibilities appears to depend on 
the administration in power.6 It may also be a matter of political opinion; 
presently, representatives of the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. 
government provide an example. Since the start of the 21st century, ongoing 
debates about immigration reform strategies7 (for both legal and against illegal 
immigration, and desired outcomes)8 have placed, and kept Mission 3 goals and 
objectives on the homeland security spotlight.  
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), as amended, is the 
legal framework underpinning Mission 3. The INA is divided into titles, chapters, 
and sections. “Although it stands alone as a body of law, the Act is also 
contained in the United States Code (U.S.C.).9 The code is a collection of all the 
laws of the United States. It is arranged in 50 subject titles by general alphabetic 
order. Title 8 of the U.S. Code is but one of the 50 titles and deals with “aliens10 
and nationality.”11  
5 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 2135. 
6 For example, see White House, Summary of Presidential Memorandum Deterring Illegal 
Immigration Under the Clinton Administration (Washington, DC: White House, 2011); White 
House, State of the Union Policy Initiatives: President Bush's Plan for Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform (Washington, DC: White House, 2007), http://georgewbushwhite 
house.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2007/initiatives/immigration.html; White House, Building a 
21st Century Immigration System (Washington, DC: White House, 2011). 
7 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, 113th Cong. 
1st sess. (June 7, 2013), S. Doc. No. 113–40.  
8 White House, Building a 21st Century Immigration System. 
9 Excerpt from U.S. Immigration and Citizenship Services, Laws: Immigration and Nationality 
Act. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
“Immigration and Nationality Act,” last reviewed/updated September 10, 2013, 
http://www.uscis.gov/laws/immigration-and-nationality-act. When browsing the INA or other 
statutes, often seen are references to the U.S.C. citation. For example, Section 208 of the INA 
deals with asylum, and is also contained in 8 U.S.C. 1158. Although it is correct to refer to a 
specific section by either its INA citation or its U.S.C. code, the INA citation is more commonly 
used. 
10 Throughout this thesis, and due to the author’s preference, the term “alien” is replaced 
with the term non-citizen or undocumented persons. Terms, such as “alien” or “illegal alien” (a 
commonly used phrase) is only used when citing existing policy or for referencing sections of law.  
11 U.S. Code: Title 8 § 1-15—Aliens and Nationality. 
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The INA provides the Secretary with authority to administer the 
immigration laws of the United States. It authorizes the arrest, detention, 
prosecution, and removal12 of “aliens” present in the United States, especially 
those identified as criminals, fugitives, and otherwise dangerous.13 The term 
“alien” is used to refer to non-citizens14 (documented and undocumented15). 
Section 101 (3) of the INA defines “aliens” as: “Any person not a citizen or 
national of the United States.”16  
12 The author uses the term “removal” throughout the document to mean a deportation, The 
Immigration Act of 1917 (Public Law 64-301) and subsequent legislation made certain 
inadmissible aliens subject to ‘exclusion’ [not allowed entry by otherwise legal means], and 
certain aliens within the United States subject to ‘deportation.’ Pursuant to §§ 301-309 of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA, Public Law 104-
208, Div. C), deportation and exclusion proceedings were combined into a unified ‘removal’ 
proceeding.” Marc R. Rosenblum and William A. Kandel, Interior Immigration Enforcement: 
Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, CRS Report R42057 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, October 21, 2011), 2, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/ 
R42057.pdf. A removal is an immigration judge (IJ)-ordered expulsion. Removal orders require 
that non-citizens receive advanced authorization from the Attorney General before attempting to 
return to the United States. Depending on the section of law under which a non-citizen is ordered 
removed (i.e., criminal behavior), a removal order may trigger a 3- to 20-year bar. In cases of 
subsequent removals, the bar may be permanent: A review of The 1996 Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amendments to the Act and prior statutes and 
case law regarding permission to reapply for admission reflects that Congress has [among other 
things] imposed a permanent bar to admission for aliens who have been ordered removed and 
who subsequently enter or attempt to enter the United States without being lawfully 
admitted…Congress has placed a high priority on deterring aliens from overstaying their 
authorized period of stay and from being present in the United States without lawful admission, 
Vermont Service Center, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the United 
States after Deportation or Removal under Section 212(a)(9)(A) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1182(a)(9)(A), (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2008 (Redacted), 4. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. Non-citizens include permanent immigrants (i.e., legal permanent residents (LPRs), 
or “green card” holders), legal nonimmigrants (i.e., temporary visa holders), and those 
undocumented or unauthorized (i.e., entered the United States without authorization or 
overstayed a temporary visa).  
15 By “undocumented,” the author means a non-citizen who entered the United States 
without authorization, (i.e., avoided inspection at a port of entry, used fraudulent documents, etc.), 
or who overstayed a temporary visa.  
16 INA § 101 (3)—Definitions.  
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Mission 3 enforcement strategies focus on arresting, detaining, 
prosecuting, and removing repeat17 immigration violators (see Figure 1) that 
include the most dangerous criminals (i.e., those who pose a threat to U.S. 
national security and public safety), human rights violators, fugitives, and the like. 
Prosecutions and subsequent removal are used as enforcement tools against 
repeat immigration violators. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws, 
“Prevention of Unlawful Immigration,” Goals and Objectives: 
An Overview18 
17 Throughout this thesis, the author uses “DHS” instead of the name of the enforcement 
component (s); the focus is not agency, but Mission 3-specific. DHS defines “repeat and 
egregious” immigration law violators, and immigration fugitives as “Individuals who return to our 
country after having been previously removed; those who engage in immigration fraud; and, 
those who flagrantly ignore an immigration court's order to leave the country,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal 
Operations, “Removal Statistics,” April 1, 2013, http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/. 
18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). 
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Repeat immigration violators include non-citizens19 who repeatedly re-
enter20 the United States without previous authorization, after prior removal or 
deportation.21 A history of violent and non-violent criminal behavior (convictions) 
prior to, or after illegal re-entry, aggravates this immigration offense. Although 
immigration violators include non-criminal persons, those with a history of violent 
and non-violent criminal behavior are the focus of this thesis22 throughout this 
document. They are referred to as “criminal immigration recidivists,”23 and their 
history of repeat immigration violations or behavior, as “criminal immigration 
recidivism.” 
More specifically, a criminal immigration recidivist is a previously removed 
non-citizen who: (1) has been removed one or more times due to a conviction for 
a criminal offense (s), in addition to the undocumented status, or (2) re-entered 
the United States after removal for a conviction of a criminal offense—without 
authorization—and was encountered as a result of an additional criminal 
conviction(s). (See Appendix A for a list of applicable criminal or “aggravated” 
felony offenses that trigger immigration enforcement.) 
Criminal immigration recidivists and “immigration recidivists” are not the 
same, and should not be confused. The former have been convicted of a criminal 
offense (in addition to the immigration violation), while the latter may be a repeat 
immigration law violator, but without a criminal conviction or record. Criminal 
19 Throughout the paper, and due to the author’s preference, the term “non-citizen” replaces 
the term alien. The term “alien” is used only when citing policy. In immigration law, the term alien 
refers to non-citizens (legal and illegal or undocumented). Legal Information Institute, “Rights, 
Privileges, and Duties of Aliens,” Cornell University Law School, November 16, 2012, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/alien.  
20 See, INA § 276—Re-entry of Removed Alien.  
21 Same as “removal.” 
22 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the United States Attorneys, “1912 8 U.S.C. § 
1326—Re-entry After Deportation (Removal): Title 9. Criminal Resource Manual 1912,” Updated 
September 2008, http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm019 
12.htm. 
23 The author addresses recidivists without a criminal history simply as “immigration 
recidivists.” 
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immigration recidivists are usually “encountered” at correctional institutions or 
“apprehended” through enforcement operations, respectively.24  
According to Rosenblum and Kandel, the term “criminal alien” is not 
specifically defined in immigration law or regulation, and its use is very broad, “At 
the broadest level, a ‘criminal alien’ is any noncitizen who has ever been 
convicted of a crime in the United States.”25 DHS defines a criminal alien26 as 
“An alien convicted for one or more crimes. This category includes individuals 
who, in addition to have been convicted of a crime, also may have been 
immigration fugitives, border removals, or were previously removed from the 
United States.”27 This comprehensive definition demands prioritization of 
resources to maximize operational efficiencies.  
DHS prioritizes its enforcement resources to manage immigration violators 
most effectively, including criminal immigration recidivists. Immigration 
enforcement priorities (“civil enforcement priorities”)28 are a law enforcement 
strategy designed to further Mission 3’s “prevention of unlawful immigration” 
goals and objectives, while at the same time, maximize available resources. “In 
light of the large number of administrative violations the agency is charged with 
addressing, and the limited enforcement resources the agency has available, 
[DHS] must prioritize the use of its enforcement personnel, detention space, and 
24 For sentencing and other purposes, “immigration recidivists” are also known as “illegal re-
entrants.” However, the term may denote criminal and non-criminal persons. 
25 Rosenblum and Kandel, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal 
Aliens, 2. 
26 Appendix B lists DHS common immigration enforcement terminology used throughout this 
document. 
27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Enforcement and Removal Operations, “Removal Statistics.” 
28 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) enforce civil enforcement priorities, but 
immigration enforcement involves more than one agency within DHS. 
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removal resources to ensure that removals [represent] the highest enforcement 
priorities, namely national security, public safety, and border security.”29 
Civil enforcement priorities focus on a non-citizen’s pre- and post-removal 
criminal history, as well as immigration violations. DHS “Civil Immigration 
Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of 
Aliens”30 lists three enforcement priority levels ranging from highest to lowest. 
Priority l Aliens, are those who pose a danger to national security or a risk to 
public safety. This category includes three levels: Level I Offenders: Aliens 
convicted of aggravated felonies,31 or of two or more crimes, each punishable by 
more than one year, commonly referred to as felonies. Level 2 Offenders: Aliens 
convicted of any felony, or three or more crimes, each punishable by less than 
one year, commonly referred to as misdemeanors. Level 3 Offenders: Aliens are 
convicted of crimes punishable by less than one year. Priority II Aliens include 
recent illegal entrants, and Priority III Aliens include fugitives (or those non-
citizens) who otherwise obstruct immigration controls.32  
According to DHS, in FY 2012,33 96 percent of all removals fell into a 
priority category: “A record achievement for the department.”34 Table 1 shows an 
overview of categories included in each priority. Noteworthy, is that criminal 
immigration recidivists fall in the lowest category for enforcement (listed and 
highlighted on Table 1 as “Priority III B”). However, and as shown on Figure 2, 
29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Enforcement and Removal Office, “Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities,” March 2, 2011, 1–4, 
[Emphasis added], http://ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf. 
30 Ibid. 
31“Aggravated” felonies as defined in §101(a)(43) of the INA include crimes of violence (i.e., 
homicide), drug trafficking, firearms offenses, etc. (See Appendix B). 
32 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Enforcement and Removal Office, “Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities,” 1–4. 
33 FY refers to the period between October 1 to September 30.  
34 Written Testimony of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Executive Associate 
Director Thomas Homan for a House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
Subcommittee on National Security Hearing Titled “Border Security Oversight: Identifying and 
Responding to Current Threats, 113th Cong., 1st sess. (June 26, 2013). 
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even when listed as a separate category—and without specifying criminal 
history—immigration recidivists resulted in the second largest removed group. 
 
Table 1.   Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens. Priority I, 
Levels 1–2 Offenders Are a Top Enforcement Priority.35  
35 John Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, 
and Removal of Aliens (Washington, DC: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf. 
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Figure 2.  FY 2012 Total Removal Data by Priorities. Immigration 
Recidivists (Priority III) Represent the Second Largest 
Proportion of Removals Although Not the Highest Priority for 
Enforcement.36 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Rates of immigration recidivism are confounding. Prosecutions for 
immigration violations appear to provide temporary incapacitation37 of further 
criminal behavior within this population, but do not seem to affect the underlying 
36 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
“Removal Statistics.”  
37 Incapacitation refers to the effect of a sanction to stop people from committing crimes by 
removing [an] offender from the community, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of 
Justice, “Topics: Corrections. Recidivism: Core Concerns,” November 14, 2012, http://www.nij. 
gov/nij/topics/corrections/recidivism/core-concern.htm. 
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behavior as much as expected. Removal from the United States represents 
“finality” since the non-citizen is no longer a threat to the community; however, 
the numbers seem to indicate that re-enforcing immigration, and other federal 
laws, against criminal immigration recidivists continue to increase.  
Criminal immigration recidivists deplete too many resources within the 
federal, state, and local governments; the lack of public awareness to this issue 
has not raised the alarm or resulted in a demand for action. 
Although listed within the lowest priority for enforcement, prevention and 
deterrence of criminal immigration recidivism is no less critical to the safety and 
security of the nation than priorities one and two. Perhaps criminal immigration 
recidivists have been assigned the lowest category for enforcement because the 
data fails to paint the entire picture about the extent of the problem. In other 
words, recidivism rates may be high, but the problem is not as critical to national 
security as to necessitate a higher priority; or it may be that congressionally 
mandated budgetary and other limitations restrict sustainable enforcement 
against this population; thereby, justifying its lower priority. These arguments are 
valid.  
If rates of criminal immigration recidivism are not as critical to national 
security, at the moment, but resources are being taxed within this population 
anyways, why do not do something about it now before the situation becomes a 
critical incident? If a new strategic plan has the potential to offset some of the 
financial burden on the American taxpayers, while potentially reducing recidivism 
within this group, why not explore its advantages and disadvantages in greater 
detail?  
Mission 3 enforcement strategies need to include options or alternatives 
with the potential to provide DHS with additional “returns on its investments.” In 
other words, resources allocated to counter criminal immigration recidivism 
provide for the safety and security of this nation’s communities is the main “return 
on investment.” However, enforcement strategies should also strive for self-
 10 
sustainability to maximize Mission 3’s limited resources against criminal 
immigration recidivism. 
1. Interventions: Prosecutions and Removals 
Prosecution and removal of criminal immigration recidivists seek to 
prevent and deter further recidivism. These interventions or forms of 
“punishment” exist or are meted-out in lieu of rehabilitation or treatment 
programs.  
Although it may seem paradoxical, as an institution of social control, the 
immigration enforcement system does not seek to correct non-citizens’ behavior 
to restore them back to the community. The system seeks to prosecute leading 
to temporary incapacitation, and then removes with the intention to effect 
permanent incapacitation. For incapacitation to be effective long term, however, 
prosecution, subsequent incarceration, and removal need to have a permanent 
impact on behavior; clearly, and increasingly, they are not.  
Based on the number of prosecutions initiated by the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) on DHS’ behalf, and on individual interpretation of the statistics, 
immigration recidivism is either: a) on the rise, b) prosecution efforts have 
exponentially lower recidivism rates, or c) no significant changes have occurred 
in recidivism levels due to these interventions. The increase in prosecutions and 
removals as a mechanism to prevent and deter further recidivism among the 
criminal immigration recidivists population is a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, an increase in prosecutions, and subsequent removals, could be seen as 
having the desired enforcement effect. On the other hand, more prosecutions 
and removals could also be interpreted as a failure of existing strategies towards 
this population. 
In November 2013, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
(TRAC), a data gathering, data research, and data distribution organization at 
Syracuse University in New York, reported on the prosecution trends against 
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recidivists dating back 20 years (see Table 2). As shown, prosecutions for illegal 
re-entry after previous removal under 8 U.S.C.1326 have steadily increased. 
 
Prosecutions  Total 
 
Lead Charge - 
 Illegal  
Re-entry 
8 USC 1326 
FY 2013  97,384 37,346 
FY 2012  91,941 37,123 
% Change from previous year (FY 2011) 5.9% 0.6% 
% Change from 5 years ago 22.6% 76.2% 
% Change from 10 years ago 367% 233% 
% Change from 20 years ago 1420% 1557% 
Table 2.   Trends in Immigration Prosecutions for Illegal Re-entry.38  
2. Criminal Immigration Recidivists in the Federal Justice System 
Criminal immigration recidivists in correctional institutions may be serving 
a sentence related only to immigration, criminal offenses, or both. Title 9 of the 
United States Attorneys’ Manual, The Criminal Resource Manual §1912, 
describes the legal framework for handling immigration recidivists in the federal 
system as follows:  
38 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), “At Nearly 100,000, Immigration 
Prosecutions Reach All-time High in FY 2013,” November 25, 2013, http://trac.syr.edu/immigr 
ation/reports/336/. 
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The basic statutory maximum penalty for re-entry after deportation 
is a fine under title 18, imprisonment for not more than 2 years, or 
both. However, with regard to an alien whose ‘removal’ was 
subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or more 
misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, 
or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), the statutory 
maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years. Moreover, if 
deportation was subsequent to conviction for an aggravated felony, 
the statutory maximum term of imprisonment is 20 years.39 
In FY 2012, the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) reported 
that illegal re-entry sentences were “increased in 74.7 percent of all [immigration] 
cases because of the offender’s criminal history.”40 The federal sentencing 
guidelines consider both the seriousness of the offense, and criminal history to 
assign offenders to one of six criminal history score categories.41 Depending on 
the extent of an offender’s past criminal violations, points are assigned within 
categories I through VI (from low to high). Certain prior convictions receive higher 
point-scores, “The number of points scored for a prior sentence (from one to 
three) is based primarily on the length of the prior sentence.”42 Criminal history 
category I is the least serious category and includes many first-time offenders. 
Criminal history category VI is the most serious, and includes offenders with 
serious criminal records.43  
In 2012, the DOJ, Office of Justice Programs (OJP), Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (BJS), published a study focused on immigration offenders in the 
39 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the United States Attorneys, “1912 8 U.S.C. § 
1326—Re-entry After Deportation (Removal): Title 9. Criminal Resource Manual 1912.”  
40 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts (Washington, DC: United States Sentencing Commission), 1–2. 
41 An in-depth discussion of sentencing categories is outside the scope of this thesis. The 
sentencing categories are only mentioned briefly to provide an overview of where criminal 
immigration recidivists fall in the spectrum.  
42 United States Sentencing Commission, Office of General Counsel, “Criminal History 
Primer,” April 2013, 1–21, http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Primers/Primer_Criminal_History.pdf. 
43 United States Sentencing Commission, Office of General Counsel, “An Overview of the 




                                            
federal justice system in 2010.44 The findings revealed that criminal immigration 
recidivists charged with illegal re-entry were more likely to have a prior conviction 
(85 percent); 65 percent had a prior felony conviction (at least three), and 34 
percent had two or more prior felony convictions. The study’s findings also 
revealed that the most common immigration offense charged in U.S. district court 
in 2010 was illegal re-entry (81 percent).45 
From FY 2008 to FY 2012, criminal immigration recidivists accounted for 
29.3 percent of all offenders in category III, with four to six criminal history 
points.46 Table 3 shows the percentages for the rest of the categories. A 
description of criminal offenses in federal court (FY 2012) is shown in Figure 3. 
As shown, in comparison to other crimes, immigration offenses rank highest (at 
32.2 percent).47 The majority of criminal immigration recidivists fall between 








44 Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Federal Justice Statistics Program, Immigration Offenders in the 
Federal Justice System, 2010,” Revised October 22, 2013, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/iofjs10.pdf.  
45 Ibid.  
46 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts, 1–2. 
47 Glenn R. Schmitt and Jennifer Dukes, “Overview of Federal Criminal Cases Fiscal Year 
2012,” United States Sentencing Commission, December 11, 2013, http://www.ussc.gov/Resear 
ch_and_Statistics/Research_Publications/2013/FY12_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf. 
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Percentage Category Criminal History Points 
18.3% I (Least Serious) 0 or 1 
22.7% II 2 or 3 
16.2% IV 7,8,9 
8.1% V 10,11,12 
5.4% VI (Most Serious) 13 or more 
Table 3.   Percentage of Criminal Immigration Recidivists by Criminal 
History Category (and Applicable Points) Based on Prior 
Sentence Length.48  
Moreover, criminal immigration recidivists are sentenced to imprisonment 
almost exclusively; in 98.5 percent of cases, imprisonment seems to be the 
preferred method used to punish, deter and modify criminal immigration 
recidivists’ behavior, with the remainder sentenced to probationary sentences 
(1.5 percent).49 Moreover, the average sentence length for immigration 
recidivists ranged between 16 and 10 months, respectively.50  
48 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts. 
49 United States Sentencing Commission, “Sentence Length in Each Primary Offense 
Category,” U. S. Sentencing Commission’s 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics–




                                            
 
Figure 3.  Overview of Federal Criminal Cases FY 2012.51  
3. Immigration Law Violators 
In FY 2013, DHS removed a total of 368,64452 non-citizens from the 
United States; of these, 159,62453 were immigration recidivists.54 According to 
51 United States Sentencing Commission, “Offenders In Each Primary Offense Category 
Fiscal Year 2012,” U. S. Sentencing Commission’s 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing 
Statistics–Figure A (Online). 
52 These removal statistics only pertain to ICE. 
 53 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate, 
“Immigration Enforcement Actions: FY 2012,” December 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2012_1.pdf. Note that the author did not use “criminal 
immigration recidivist” to cite FY 12–13 figures, as the report containing the data does not clearly 
make this distinction. 
54 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Enforcement and Removal, “FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, ERO Annual Report,” 
December 19, 2013, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2013-ice-immigration-
removals.pdf. 
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the department, many of the criminal non-citizens removed from the interior of 
the United States (not from a port of entry or at “the border”) also fell into other 
priority categories. For example, out of 133, 551 were apprehended in the 
interior, and 82 percent were previously convicted of a criminal offense. Further, 
in FY 2012, DHS removed 409,849 individuals overall; of these, 149,000 or 36 
percent were immigration recidivists. Closely to 55 percent, or 225,390, had a 
criminal conviction, which represents “almost double the total removals of 
criminals in FY 2008.”55 
In FY 2011, immigration recidivists accounted for 130,000, or 33 percent, 
of all removals.56 For the same fiscal year, the number of non-citizens who were 
either immigration recidivists or immigration fugitives was 96,529.57 Figure 4 
shows a time-line of total removals by priority from FY 2008 to FY 2012.  
These statistics indicate that an undeterred population of immigration 
recidivists (criminal and non-criminal) is found within all three civil immigration 
priorities and levels, even though such are outlined separately. These statistics 
also provide an overview of the large number of criminal removals conducted 
every year, and the need to look more closely at immigration recidivists. The 
overview presented on removal, prosecution, and sentencing data serves to 
illustrate immigration enforcement general operational system, and opportunities 
for alternatives. 
55 Written Testimony of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Executive Associate 
Director Thomas Homan for a House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
Subcommittee on National Security Hearing Titled “Border Security Oversight: Identifying and 
Responding to Current Threats. 
56 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate, 
Immigration Enforcement Actions: FY 2011 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate, September 2012). 
57 Ibid. 
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Figure 4.  FY 2008–FY 2012 Total Removal Data by Priority.58 
4. Expenditures on Enforcement 
When compared to other law enforcement agencies’ budgets, DHS leads 
spending on enforcement within the federal government. A 2013 report 
conducted by the MPI indicated that the U.S. government spends more on 
immigration related enforcement than on all its criminal federal law enforcement 
agencies combined. MPI also noted that based on FY 2012 budget requests and 
allocations, the DHS immigration enforcement budget was approximately  
58 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
“Removal Statistics.” 
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$18 billion, exceeding by almost 24 percent total spending by the FBI, the DEA, 
the USSS, the ATF and the USMS.59  
In immigration detention alone, DHS spends approximately USD $160 
million a year to fund 33,400 detention beds.60 Some might argue that this figure 
is low (i.e., about $4,800 per year, per bed); however, it is important to keep in 
mind that detention costs are only a “small” part of the overall immigration 
enforcement budget; transportation, healthcare, prosecutions, removal, etc., are 
other costs that need to be considered.61 
Although staggering, this figure is able to cover the costs of enforcing the 
removal of about 400,000 priority immigration offenders a year.62 The high cost 
and limited number of available detention space further restricts enforcement 
against criminal immigration recidivists.  
a. Statistical and Other Limitations 
The DHS definition of immigration recidivists includes both criminal and 
non-criminal non-citizens. Likewise, its definition of criminal non-citizens includes 
both immigration recidivists and non-recidivists.63 These differences play a factor 
in how the statistics on criminal immigration recidivists should be examined.64 
59 Doris Meissner, Donald M. Kerwin, Muzaffar Chishti, and Claire Bergeron, “Immigration 
Enforcement in the United States, The Rise of a Formidable Machinery,” Migration Policy 
Institute, January 2013, 37, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-
united-states-rise-formidable-machinery. 
60 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Congressional Budget Justification: Salaries and 
Expenses FY2012,” April 4, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-congressional-budget-
justification-fy2012.pdf.  
61 These figures include ICE detention expenses only, not those of other DHS components 
such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Border Patrol. 
62 A review of the DHS budget proposal did not show any allocations (in dollar amounts) 
devoted to operations against criminal immigration recidivists specifically. U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, “Congressional Budget Justification: Salaries and Expenses FY2012.” 
63 The DHS definition is based on the INA § 276: “Re-entry of Removed Alien.” 
64 Immigration recidivists may be undocumented (illegal) but not have any criminal history; 
likewise, they may have a criminal history in addition to being undocumented. 
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Based on the research, it appears the same methods are used to account 
for criminals, non-criminals, recidivists, and first time offenders. By itself, an 
arrest does not trigger a criminal conviction. This is an important observation 
because the author’s definition of criminal immigration recidivists includes 
convictions not arrests. As a result, an immigration recidivist may not necessarily 
be a criminal. Likewise, an immigration violator may be a recidivist, but not a 
criminal. To aid the reader, Figure 5 shows the differences and similarities 
between these categories. 
 
Figure 5.  Differences and Similarities Between Immigration Violators 
and Criminal Immigration Recidivists. 
To further complicate analysis, convicted terrorists are included within 
removal data statistics, but as a separate category (i.e., national security threat, 
status violator, etc.); that is, the reported number of total removals in a fiscal year 
may include first-time criminal offenders, non-criminals, fugitives, recidivists, non-
recidivists, terrorists, etc. From this total, the number of fugitives, convicted 
criminals, non-criminals, immigration recidivists, and terrorists are drawn; 
however, the distinction between who among these groups falls specifically into a 
criminal immigration recidivist (violent and non-violent) category, or in more than 
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one category, is not made. Other than adding to the confusion of determining 
who is who, or what is what, all these categories may inevitably lead to statistical 
inflation (“double counting”). 
As seen in Figures 2 and 4, the data seemed to indicate that the highest 
consumers of immigration enforcement resources are criminal non-citizens, 
followed by repeat violators (recidivists), and recent border crossers. However, 
this interpretation may be misleading. Figure 6 and Table 4 show the most recent 
statistics (FY 2013) based on priority and level; the pie shows that recidivists 
account for the majority of removals on Priority I, Level III. However, the table 
shows that, overall, criminals account for the bulk of all removals. Whether the 
data on recidivists’ removals include non-citizens with criminal histories, or 
criminal data includes a history of immigration, recidivism cannot be determined 
by just analyzing the statistics. This is a major shortcoming of the project. 
Prosecution numbers further add to the difficulty in differentiating 
increases in immigration recidivism among criminal non-citizens, as opposed to 
non-criminal or first time immigration violators. In other words, statistics on 
prosecutions for illegal re-entry are not broken down by level of previous criminal 
history since illegal re-entry after removal, in and of itself, is a criminal offense. 
Due to these and other significant limitations on what constitutes a 
criminal immigration recidivist, the high number of prosecutions and removals 
among this population should be examined with skepticism. In general, the point 
the author is trying to make is that whether criminal immigration recidivists are 
considered a top priority for enforcement or not is irrelevant; resources are being 
spent within this population regardless. As a result, developing strategic options 
for targeting this population is a must. 
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Figure 6.  FY 2013 Interior Removal Data by Priority.65  
 
Table 4.   FY 2013 Interior Removal Data by Priority.66  
B. HYPOTHESIS: CIVIL RESTITUTION AS A STRATEGIC TOOL TO LIMIT 
CRIMINAL IMMIGRATION RECIDIVISM 
The reported high rate of criminal immigration recidivism, coupled with 
enforcement limitations, and depletion of resources result in operational 
handicaps. Prosecution and removal appear to have a limited impact on the 
criminal immigration recidivist population. As a result, this thesis argues in favor 
65 Enforcement and Removal, “FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, ERO Annual Report.”  
66 Ibid. 
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of introducing a CR policy model to Mission 3’s “prevention of unlawful 
immigration” goals and objectives. 
The concept of CR is modeled after restitution’s theoretical underpinnings 
as an alternative sanction in the criminal justice system. CR borrows from 
restitution’s focus on holding offenders accountable for the financial losses their 
offenses have caused to their victims, and its potential cost-savings due to lower 
recidivism rates.  
As proposed by the author, CR is an enforcement strategy used in lieu of, 
or as an alternative to prosecution against criminal immigration recidivists. CR 
would grant to DHS the authority to demand and collect reimbursement from 
criminal immigration recidivists, for the costs of re-enforcing or reinitiating the 
removal process. The offender’s reimbursement would mainly cover detention 
and transportation costs to the country of origin. CR would authorized DHS to act 
on behalf of the “victims” (i.e., the American taxpayers) who are the parties 
directly affected or burdened by repeated immigration enforcement costs. 
The thesis posits and seeks to validate several assumptions regarding the 
development and implementation of a CR policy model within Mission 3: (1) that 
it is feasible to implement a CR scheme within the immigration enforcement 
system, (2) that CR will shift the costs of repeat enforcement from the taxpayers 
to the recidivists; thereby, serving to self-sustain Mission 3’s goals and 
objectives, and (3) that as a result of transferring the costs of reinitiating the 
removal process from DHS to the recidivists, CR’s outcomes will result in lower 
rates of criminal immigration recidivism. 
C. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
1. Burden on Society 
The effects of restitution (or the modified version proposed in this thesis) 
on criminal immigration recidivism have not been studied thus far. This thesis 
project seeks to open the door for research on this subject. This project is 
 23 
tailored to this population due to increase prosecution workloads for illegal re-
entry after removal (as per INA §276) in federal district court.  
Managing the criminal immigration recidivist population is a critical social 
issue that must be addressed immediately. Taxpayers should not be responsible 
for the costs of reinitiating the removal process against criminal immigration 
recidivists, even though it is in their communities’ best interest to remove them.  
CR critics will probably argue that if the government wants these 
individuals removed, then the status quo has to remain. That is, the government 
should be responsible for all expenses related to reinforcement; after all, funds 
are allocated towards this endeavor for this reason, right? This argument is not 
without merit, but it misses the big picture. The data raises awareness to more 
than just the problem of illegal and criminal immigration recidivism in the nation; 
the economic impact to this nation’s society needs to become part of the 
discourse. 
CR in lieu of prosecution considers the human condition, global 
influences, diversity management, and multiculturalism; it proposes a win-win 
situation in an ethical and humane manner.  
2. The Need for Alternatives 
It is important to explore implementing the concept of CR within the 
immigration enforcement system, and its potential benefits for homeland security. 
Criminal immigration recidivists discredit the legitimacy of the immigration 
enforcement system; they do so by re-entering the country illegally, in large 
numbers, and often committing new crimes. When a criminal immigration 
recidivist is re-apprehended and prosecuted, too many resources are taxed at 
the federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal levels.  
It could be said that criminal immigration recidivists defy homeland 
security and public safety goals. Criminal immigration recidivism warrants further 
research to ascertain whether an opportunity exists for strategic policy 
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improvements in the area of immigration enforcement. The time is ripe to 
implement any policy changes in the immigration enforcement arena, as the 
country is abuzz with immigration reform talks.67 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
For a population that appears undeterred by the threat of apprehension, 
prosecution, detention, and removal, perhaps a different or additional approach 
could be incorporated into policy. This thesis explored the merits of the addition 
of CR as an intervention against criminal immigration recidivism into Mission 3’s 
“prevention of unlawful immigration” goals and objectives.  
This research project started with the assumption that the general criminal 
and the criminal immigration populations behaved the same (in terms of 
recidivism); as a result of this assumption, the author sought to answer the 
following questions. 
• In general, what is restitution’s utility for the criminal justice system?  
• Given the similarities between the criminal justice and immigration 
enforcement systems, to what extent is the addition of a CR Policy 
Model to Mission 3’s “prevention of unlawful immigration” goals and 
objectives feasible? 
• Assuming that adding a CR Policy Model to Mission 3 is feasible, 
what strategic recommendations or core factor modifications would 
be required to develop and implement it? 
To search for the answers to these questions, the author reviewed the 
literature on restitution as applied within the American system of justice: its 
purpose, use, application, expectations, and challenges. 
E. OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
The thesis is divided into five chapters (I–V). Chapter II discusses the 
literature on restitution, its origins, evolution, use, application, expectations, 
limitations, etc., in the criminal justice system. The literature review section 
67 White House, Building a 21st Century Immigration System; also see the Border Security, 
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, June 7, 2013.  
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explored the varied schools of thought on restitution’s effectiveness in modifying 
criminal behavior, and thus, recidivism. Concepts explored in this section include 
civil versus criminal restitution, criminal justice enforcement versus immigration 
enforcement, and restorative justice. 
Chapter III describes the thesis’ methodology. The project relies on 
statistical data on criminal immigration recidivists’ prosecutions, sentencing, and 
removals to argue in favor of implementing CR as alternative enforcement 
strategy within Mission 3. The research designs include exploratory and causal 
elements to describe the target sample population, control population sample 
characteristics, interventions, and comparisons. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion on methods’ limitations. 
Chapter IV discusses the CR policy model development and 
implementation, which is the key chapter of the thesis. The research designs’ 
findings, current enforcement practices and limitations, and the model 
development and implementation steps are discussed. The chapter illustrates 
how a pilot program with a selected sample (e.g., non-violent criminal 
immigration recidivists) may be ideal to introduce this radical enforcement 
approach.  
Chapter V concludes the thesis project. The chapter summarizes the 
research findings, CR’s implementation main goals, pros, cons, and implications 
for homeland security. It closes by suggesting further areas of research in the 
area of recidivism and immigration enforcement. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. RESTITUTION TO DETER RECIDIVISM 
1. Civil vs. Criminal Restitution 
Definitions of restitution are context-specific. The Cornell University Law 
School, Legal Information Institute (LII) offers two divergent definitions for civil 
and criminal restitution. In civil cases, restitution refers to “a remedy associated 
with unjust enrichment in which the amount of recovery is typically based on the 
defendant’s gain rather than the plaintiff’s loss.”68 On the other hand, in criminal 
cases, restitution refers to “full or partial compensation for loss paid by a criminal 
to a victim that is ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a condition of 
probation.”69 The CR policy model derives elements from both definitions, since 
civil and criminal law apply to immigration offenses. 
2. Criminal Justice Enforcement vs. Immigration Enforcement 
Just as immigration enforcement policy goals seek to reduce criminal 
immigration recidivism, so too do the criminal justice system’s policies against 
criminal recidivism. The latter’s methods for achieving these goals are notably 
multifaceted. Besides punishment, the most common include retribution, just 
deserts, rehabilitation (treatment), and restitution. One of the philosophies behind 
these interventions is to serve not only social functions—e.g., justice and order—
but also restore the offender(s) back into society. 
Depending on the seriousness of an offense, restitution is imposed alone 
or in combination with other non-economic sanctions. The 2012 Sourcebook of 




                                            
Federal Sentencing Statistics, published by the USSC, illustrates that a fine or 
restitution was ordered in 21.7 percent of all cases in that year.70  
In contrast, immigration enforcement interventions are more rigid, in that 
they are void of mutually beneficial alternatives; a criminal immigration recidivist 
is prosecuted and removed, but no additional options can be drawn upon if these 
sanctions fail. CR seeks to change this. 
3. Restorative Justice 
Criminal justice programs are founded on the concept of Restorative 
Justice with restitution being one of many strategic options.71 In “The 
Effectiveness of Restorative Justice Practices: A Meta-Analysis,” they wrote, 
“Arguably, one of the most important outcome variables for any form of criminal 
justice intervention is recidivism.”72 
Restitution serves to fulfill key criminal justice goals, mainly deterrence of 
criminal behavior. Restitution as a restorative justice concept is rooted in 
philosophical doctrines; “some of the values in which this concept rests include 
the axioms of human cognition and rationality, fairness, morality, and ethics.”73  
Cares, Hoskins, and Ruback argue that restitution and other economic 
sanctions are popular because of the goals they serve. In recent years, 
[economic sanctions] have become more common because they serve multiple 
criminal justice system goals: (a) having the offender offset some of the costs of 
prosecution and corrections, (b) restoring victims, (c) allowing for cheaper 
alternatives to incarceration, and (d) meeting the traditional objectives of 
punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation. If these goals are being realized, 
70 In and of themselves, apprehension, and/or fines are not considered punishment for 
immigration purposes, but their use may lead to possible prosecution and removal..  
71 Jeff Latimer, Craig Dowden, and Danielle Muise, “The Effectiveness of Restorative Justice 
Practices: A Meta-Analysis,” The Prison Journal 85, no. 2 (June 2005). 
72 Ibid. 
73 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Training Manual on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Restorative Justice,” 2007, http://www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria//publications/ 
Otherpublications/Trainin_manual_on_alternative_dispute_resolution_and_restorative_justice.pdf. 
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offenders who pay their ordered economic sanctions should be less likely to 
recidivate.74 
The upcoming literature review provides an overview on how economic 
sanctions (restitution specifically) have been correlated to lower criminal 
recidivism rates. Restitution’s ineffectiveness in lowering recidivism, as well as 
the literature on mixed results, is also presented. 
B. RESTITUTION AS EFFECTIVE  
Several publications cite empirical and experimental studies that have 
examined the effectiveness of restitution in reducing offender recidivism in both 
adult and juvenile populations, as seen in Anne L. Schneider and Peter R. 
Schneider, “The Impact of Restitution on Recidivism of Juvenile Offenders: An 
Experiment in Clayton County, Georgia”; Laurie Ervin and Anne Schneider, 
“Explaining the Effects of Restitution on Offenders: Results from a National 
Experiment in Juvenile Courts”; R. Barry Ruback and Mark H. Bergstrom, 
“Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice: Purposes, Effects, and Implications”; 
Yvon Dandurand and Curt T. Griffiths, “Handbook on Restorative Justice 
Programmes” Crime Victims Institute in 2006; National Institute of Justice in 
2007; National Center for Victims of Crime, “Making Restitution Real: Five Case 
Studies on Improving Restitution Collection”; Vivienne Chin, “Introductory 
Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of 
Offenders,” and others. These studies have been cited in journal articles, books, 
and government publications and reports, etc., in support of restitution programs 
as alternative sanctions to incarceration.  
In addition to providing several advantages over other types of penalties to 
both the offender and the criminal justice system, restitution offers greater 
74 Alison Cares, Stacy Hoskins, and R. Barry Ruback, “Economic Sanctions and Recidivism,” 
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Atlanta Marriott 
Marquis, Atlanta, GA, November 13, 2007. Unpublished article, ed. American Society of 
Criminology, 2007. 
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accountability to victims and society.75 During its early developmental years as a 
criminal justice sanction, Barnett predicted that restitution would save taxpayers’ 
funds, as it would shift the burden to offenders. He argued, “The savings to 
taxpayers would be enormous. No longer would the innocent taxpayer pay for the 
apprehension and internment of the guilty. The cost of arrest, trial, and 
internment would be borne by the criminal himself.”76  
Experimental studies on restitution and criminal recidivism have shown 
significant effects, particularly in criminal juvenile and delinquent offenders. 
Findings from a Clayton County, Georgia, experiment indicate that juveniles 
required to make restitution to their victims have lower recidivism rates than 
those given more traditional juvenile court dispositions.77  
C. RESTITUTION AS NOT EFFECTIVE  
Another body of literature offers counter-arguments on restitution’s 
effectiveness as a crime control strategy, particularly against recidivism. Barnett 
argued that those who criticized restitution as a crime control strategy did so 
based on assumptions about punishment’s effectiveness as the sole deterrent to 
criminal behavior.78 Studies criticizing the use of restitution are mostly victim-
focused not offender-focused; they argue for the use of restitution from a non-
punitive and rehabilitative perspective “as crime is a violation of people and 
relationships,”79 rather than a “mere violation of law.”80 Galaway in, “The Use of 
75 R. Barry Ruback and Mark H. Bergstrom, “Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice: 
Purposes, Effects, and Implications,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 33, no. 2 (April 2006): 242–
273; National Center for Victims of Crime, “Making Restitution Real: Five Case Studies on 
Improving Restitution Collection,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, Office for Victims of Crime, National Center for Victims of Crime, 2011, http://www. 
victimsofcrime.org/docs/Reports%20and%20Studies/2011_restitutionreport_web.pdf. 
76 Randy E. Barnett, “Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice,” Ethics 87, no. 4 (July 
1977): 279–301. 
77 Anne L. Schneider and Peter R. Schneider, “The Impact of Restitution on Recidivism of 
Juvenile Offenders: An Experiment in Clayton County, Georgia,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 
10, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 242–273. 
78 Barnett, “Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice,” 294–296. 
79 Howard J. Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime & Justice, 3rd ed. (Scottsdale, 
PA: Herald Press, 2005).  
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Restitution,” furthered this argument by asserting that restitution’s goal is 
obtaining justice for victims and not eradication of all crime.  
On the other hand, Caputo argued that intermediate sanctions (such as 
restitution) are usually no more effective at reducing recidivism than probation, 
parole, or incarceration.81 Farrington, Petrosino, and Welsh argued that as 
correctional interventions, alternative sanctions are ineffective in reducing 
recidivism. They claimed that changes in research methodology have resulted in 
false-positive results regarding their effectiveness:  
The advent of meta-analysis meant that statistical techniques could 
be applied to systematic reviews, especially to the results of 
correctional program evaluations. Meta-analytic methods of 
evaluating the effectiveness of correctional treatments focused on 
effect size rather than statistical significance, which is heavily 
influenced by factors that have little to do with effectiveness, such 
as sample size. Given this change in the criteria for success, there 
was little surprise that meta-analyses began to report evidence of 
correctional effectiveness. Meta-analyses since 1985 have 
consistently reported that correctional programs generally reduce 
recidivism and have examined the influence of different types of 
treatments and other study features on results.82 
D. MIXED RESULTS STUDIES  
A body of literature exists that neither advocates, nor proposes, the use of 
restitution as a crime control strategy against recidivism; some are not 
completely oppose to its use, while others recommend its use only if 
supplemented with some other types of sanctions, or further research. First, 
Caputo argues that research on restitution is “virtually non-existent, probably 
80 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Training Manual on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Restorative Justice,” 2007, http://www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria//publications/ 
Otherpublications/Trainin_manual_on_alternative_dispute_resolution_and_restorative_justice.pdf. 
81 Gail A. Caputo, Intermediate Sanctions in Corrections (Denton, TX: University of North 
Texas Press, 2004), ch. 10, “Conclusion,” 190.  
82 David P. Farrington, Anthony Petrosino, and Brandon C. Welsh, “Systematic Reviews and 
Cost-Benefit Analyses of Correctional Interventions,” The Prison Journal 81, no. 3 (September 
2001): 344–345. 
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because most restitution programs do not aim to divert offenders from prison.”83 
Very few offenders have participated in intermediate sanctions (such as 
restitution) to determine its effects on criminal recidivism.84 
Ferrara, in “Retribution and Restitution: A Synthesis,” opposes expansion 
of restitution programs until its purpose, relationship to other sanctions, the role 
of the victim, and a properly designed classification system are developed. 
Similarly, Dagger argues against the use of restitution as a sole criminal sanction 
because it lacks both punishment and retribution elements, which are essential in 
an effective system of justice. He advocates for the creation of a justice system 
that combines elements of both, restitution and punishment.85  
On the other hand, Latimer, Dowden, and Muise, in “The Effectiveness of 
Restorative Justice Practices: A Meta-Analysis,” conducted a meta-analysis on 
previous empirical studies on restitution’s effectiveness against recidivism. The 
authors questioned the reliability of statistical methods employed in the literature 
to test the effectiveness of restitution as a deterrent to criminal behavior, and 
thus, recidivism. The authors argued that narrative and qualitative approaches to 
summarizing empirical research are unreliable and lack objectivity. Instead, the 
researchers proposed utilizing meta-analytic techniques to analyze restitution’s 
effects on recidivism.86  
After aggregating data from existing studies that compared restorative 
approaches to criminal behavior (including restitution), Latimer, Dowden, and 
Muise concluded that restorative programs were found to be significantly more 
effective than non-traditional approaches.87 However, the authors cautioned that 
such positive effects could have been influenced by what they called “self-
selection bias.” In this regard, the authors explained, “Self-selection bias is an 
83 Caputo, Intermediate Sanctions in Corrections, ch. 7, 146. 
84 Ibid., ch. 10, 187–195. 
85 Richard Dagger, “Restitution: Pure or Punitive?” Criminal Justice Ethics 10, no. 2 (1991). 
86 Ibid., 130. 
87 Ibid., 138. 
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inherent problem in restorative justice research as it is not possible to truly 
randomly assign participants to treatment and control conditions.”88  
E. LITERATURE LIMITATIONS  
The available literature on restitution defends its use as an intervention in 
the criminal justice system because it is effective against criminal recidivism, and 
it may result in operational cost-s. Restitution is not imposed as a sole sanction 
(or in lieu of imprisonment)—contrary to the author’s CR policy model proposal 
for Mission 3. Restitution is victim-oriented, and its application is meant to benefit 
the victim—although, it also “benefits” the offender since it is imposed as a 
condition for probation or parole from confinement. 
Some criticize its use because of the emphasis placed on the offender and 
the crime committed, and not solely on the victim. In contrast, some contend that 
restitution is ineffective as a criminal justice sanction because it lacks the 
required elements of punishment and retribution. As such, it cannot be used as a 
sole intervention because offenders will view it “as a soft approach” on crime. 
Middle-ground literature neither advocates nor opposes restitution’s use 
as an effective intervention against recidivism; instead, it asks for more 
comprehensive studies that can show its effectiveness in lowering recidivism 
across different populations, and in reducing operational costs. 
Nonetheless, the scholarly, experimental, and empirical literature on 
restitution leaves many questions unanswered. Although the literature suggests 
restitution may be a deterrent against criminal recidivism, it concedes that its 
effectiveness may be questionable due to lack of randomized and representative 
samples. It is unclear from the literature, and the diverse points of views, whether 
the research methods or the actual intervention have failed to produce 
statistically significant effects on criminal recidivism. 
88 Dagger, “Restitution: Pure or Punitive?,” 138 
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In addition, the literature is either lacking, dated, or not clear on whether 
restitution is as effective in adult criminal populations as in juvenile populations, 
or to what extent. The literature did not address restitution’s impact on the types 
of offenses or the threshold monetary amount (on average) that causes the 
greatest impact on offenders’ behavior.  
A key question the literature did not address was the outcome—in terms 
of re-offending—of an offender’s financial ability to satisfy an order of restitution. 
It is unknown whether offenders who are able to satisfy an order of restitution are 
more or less likely to reoffend, in comparison to offenders financially unable to do 
so.  
Nevertheless, the lack of relevant studies on restitution’s effect on criminal 
behavior serves to support, rather than nullify, the author’s hypothesis. Since 
restitution’s effectiveness in lowering criminal recidivism has not been thoroughly 
studied across criminal populations, testing its applicability within the immigration 
enforcement system (i.e., on previously convicted criminal offenders) is an 
opportunity not to be missed. Developing and implementing a CR policy model 
would set in motion further research on this important area of offender-
management. 
As a result, this thesis focuses on analyzing the feasibility (i.e., pros and 
cons) of developing and implementing a CR policy model within the immigration 
enforcement system. The CR model is designed to transfer the costs of re-
enforcing the removal process from DHS to the criminal immigration recidivist. 
After implementation and testing, outcome measures would determine CR’s 
effectiveness in other operational enforcement areas. 
The upcoming section, discusses the methodology used to research and 
design the proposed CR policy model.  
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The author employed a hybrid design that integrated an exploratory and 
causal path to test the thesis’ hypothesis, and search for the answers to the 
research questions. The working hypothesis is: (1) that it is feasible to implement 
a CR scheme within the immigration enforcement system, (2) that CR will shift 
the costs of repeat enforcement from the taxpayers to the recidivists; hereby, 
serving to self-sustain Mission 3’s goals and objectives, and, (3) that as a result 
of transferring the costs of reinitiating the removal process from DHS to the 
recidivists, CR’s outcomes will result in lower rates of criminal immigration 
recidivism. 
The project is divided into three research parts: part one included 
immigration enforcement, part two, the criminal justice system’s use of restitution, 
and part three, the likelihood or frequency of immigration offenders receiving 
restitution orders as a sanction in federal district court. The third section was 
further divided into four subsections to identify any association between feasibility 
and intervention. Subsection (1) presents the target population sample 
characteristics. Subsection (2) presents the control population sample 
characteristics. Subsection (3) presents the applied intervention Subsection (4) 
presents the comparison between samples and applied intervention.  
A structured research plan was followed that allowed for a review a wide 
variety of materials, and compilation of as many results as possible. The 
research plan relied on primary, secondary, open and restricted sources.89 
Electronic and hard copy materials were reviewed, and unpublished documents 
were obtained from various libraries, databases, as well as personally owned 
material relating to immigration enforcement.  
As previously mentioned, the focus of this research project is on criminal 
immigration recidivists (violent and non-violent). Data collection on federal 
89 Access to restricted material provided by the Dudley Knox Library. 
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prosecutions for criminal immigration recidivists’ was narrowed to the nation’s top 
five districts. According to the United States Sentencing Commission, the District 
of Arizona, the Southern District of California, the District of New Mexico, and the 
Southern and Western Districts of Texas represent the top five districts for illegal 
re-entry prosecutions in 2012.90 The author hypothesized that if restitution is 
shown to lead a decline in recidivism rates among the criminal population in the 
same regions, narrowing the scope to these top five districts for illegal re-entry 
prosecutions would make the best argument in favor of developing and 
implementing a CR model pilot program. The exploratory design methodology is 
discussed first.  
A. EXPLORATORY RESEARCH DESIGN 
According to the University of Southern California (USC), an exploratory 
design is “conducted about a research problem when there are few or no earlier 
studies to refer to. The focus is on gaining insights and familiarity for later 
investigation…”91 As previously mentioned, this research did not find any studies 
relating to immigration enforcement and restitution. This research choice was 
useful in providing insight and familiarity with basic concepts, details, settings, 
issues, and challenges relating to restitution, recidivism, and immigration 
enforcement. The information gathered made it possible to address the research 
questions, develop conceptual definitions (e.g., CR), and propose 
recommendations for future research. 
The author collected, compiled, and reviewed DHS removal and 
enforcement statistics from 2007 to 2012. According to the Office of Immigration 
Statistics (OIS), official or formal data collection on repeat immigration violators 
found in the interior of the United States (as opposed to being encountered at the 
border) began in FY 2006, and reported the following year. Data on immigration 
90 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts, 1.  
91 University of California, “Organizing Your Social Sciences Research, Types of Research 
Designs,” September 23, 2013, http://libguides.usc.edu/content.php?pid=83009&sid=818072. 
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enforcement actions (i.e., prosecutions and removals), detention population and 
policies, budget, expenditures and allocations, etc., were also obtained from 
open-source documents, such as congressional hearings or transcripts, reports 
from government oversight agencies, DHS, think-tanks, peer-reviewed journals, 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
Specifically, the author reviewed reports published by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) in 1998 and 2011; the DHS Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) in 2011; Carl F. Horowitz in “An Examination of U.S. Immigration Policy 
and Serious Crime”; the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1996; the Migration 
Policy Institute (MPI) in 2011 and 2013; the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) in 2013; for the ACLU in Georgia in 2012, and the ACLU in Arizona in 
2011; the Detention Watch Network, “The History of Immigration Detention in the 
U.S. A Rapidly-Expanding Detention System”; the National Immigration Forum, 
“The Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for Immigration Detention 
Do Not Add Up to Sensible Policies”; for the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (TRAC), “At Nearly 100,000, Immigration Prosecutions Reach All-
time High in FY 2013”; Marc R. Rosenblum and William A. Kandel, “Interior 
Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens,” the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) in 2012; Human Rights First, “Jails and 
Jumpsuits: Transforming the U.S. Immigration Detention System-A Two Year 
Review,” the Justice Policy Institute (JPI) in 2011; Teresa Hayter, “No Borders: 
The Case Against Immigration Controls”; David Alan Sklansky, “Crime, 
immigration, and ad hoc instrumentalism”; Robert Bach, “Transforming Border 
Security: Prevention First”; Sarah Gryll, “Immigration Detention Reform: No 
Band-Aid Desired”; Geoffrey Heeren, “Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory 
Immigration Detention”; Bridget Kessler, “In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing . . . No 
Problem? A Closer Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process 
Standards of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”; Stephen H. 
Legomsky, “The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of 
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Criminal Justice Norms”; Kant’s Legal Positivism, “The Immigration Crisis: 
Detention As an Emerging Mechanism of Social Control,” and others. 
Also reviewed were criminal justice websites and manuals on corrections 
management as the starting points to gather information on restitution. Electronic 
searches on the terms “restitution” and “recidivism,” were conducted and many 
results obtained from Google; Google Scholar; government and inter-
governmental portals; journals, etc. For example, searches in the National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ), the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention (OJJDP), and others, provided many useful resources. The National 
Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), “New Directions from the Field: 
Restitution,” Chapter 15 (archives); the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), Yvon Dandurand and Curt T. Griffiths, “Handbook on 
Restorative Justice Programmes”; and the Office of Victims of Crime (OVC), 
Ordering Restitution to the Crime Victim, provided the author with the historical, 
and theoretical context, on restitution’s evolution and utility for the American 
system of justice.  
After gaining a broader understanding of criminal immigration recidivism, 
and reviewing the literature on restitution, the author proceeded to the second 
part of the methodology, the causal research design. 
B. CAUSAL RESEARCH DESIGN 
To gain an understanding of restitution’s possible effects on behavior, a 
causal research design process was employed, “Causality studies may be 
thought of as understanding a phenomenon in terms of conditional statements in 
the form, ‘if X, then Y.’ This type of research is used to measure what impact a 
specific change will have on existing norms and assumptions.”92 This part of the 
methodology sought to identify the impact that implementing a CR policy model 
(independent variable) would have on criminal immigration recidivists (dependent 
92 University of California, “Organizing Your Social Sciences Research, Types of Research 
Designs.” 
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variable), as they absorb from DHS the costs of re-enforcing the removal 
process.  
This thesis assumed no behavioral differences existed between criminal 
offenders and criminal immigration recidivists. As a result, she wanted to 
correlate restitution’s application in the criminal justice system and its potential 
applicability to similar populations, but in the immigration enforcement system.  
She hypothesized that if, as an intervention or sanction, restitution 
reduced reinforcement costs, which resulted in lower recidivism rates among 
criminal populations, then it can also lower recidivism within criminal immigration 
recidivist populations.  
Data collection for this part of the research methodology was subdivided 
into four sections: target sample population, control population sample 
characteristics, interventions, and comparison. 
1. Target Sample Population 
The author reviewed the offenders’ characteristics of criminal immigration 
recidivists as compiled by the BJS in Immigration Offenders in the Federal 
Justice System 2010; the United States Sentencing Commission’s Annual 
Reports from 2010 to 2012; and in the 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing 
Statistics. 
BJS reports offer the most comprehensive data regarding immigration 
offenders’ characteristics in the federal justice system, such as criminal history, 
recidivism rates, nationality, gender, etc. Similarly, the Sentencing Commission 
Annual reports and Sourcebook detail the sentencing breakdown imposed on all 
types of federal cases, and across offenders’ categories. Whenever possible, for 
the purposes of consistency with the BJS report, the author tried to cite 
sentencing data from 2010 through 2012 reports. 
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2. Control Population Sample Characteristics 
The characteristics’ of criminal recidivists were reviewed in terms of 
offense type, and criminal history in the top five districts for illegal re-entry 
prosecutions. The author wanted to analyze whether any similarities existed 
between criminal immigration and criminal recidivists in terms of offense type, 
offenders’ characteristics, or rate of re-offending. The data was obtained from the 
United States Sentencing Commission Annual Reports; the 2012 Sourcebook; 
the TRAC, and the BJS.  
3. Intervention 
The type of sanctions applied to criminal recidivists in the same districts as 
criminal immigration recidivists were reviewed. Specifically, the author 
highlighted the types of offenses or offenders who received restitution, and 
whether it was imposed as a primary, secondary sanction, or in lieu of 
confinement. This step made it possible to cross-reference offenses with 
outcomes to conduct a comparative assessment between criminal and 
immigration offenders. 
For this subsection, the author mostly analyzed peer-reviewed journals, 
think tanks, and inter-governmental publications on restitution’s impact on re-
enforcement costs, and subsequent reductions in criminal recidivism. For 
example, the review included publications from Crime & Delinquency in 1997 and 
2010; Criminal Justice Review in 1985; Criminal Justice Ethics in 1991; the 
Brennan Center for Justice in 2010; “Restitution in Texas: A Report to the 
Legislature,” in 2006; the National Center for Victims of Crime in 2011; and in 
Boom: A Journal of California in 2011. 
Also reviewed were articles published in Criminal Justice and Behavior in 
2006; the Criminal Justice Policy Review in 2011; the Prison Journal in 2001 and 
2005; the Justice Professional in 2000; Justice Strategies in 2012; the University 
of Chicago Law Review in 2013; Political Behavior in 2012; The Prisoner Re-
entry Institute at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in 2007; Criminal Justice 
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Studies in 2012; Ethics in 1977; the American Sociological Review in 1989; the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2007; and the 
Introductory Handbook on the Prevention of Recidivism and the Social 
Reintegration of Offenders in 2012. 
Lastly, empirical and meta-analysis studies, articles, and reports on 
restitution, recidivism, and immigration enforcement were examined. Some of 
these included the DOJ, OJP, Office of Victims of Crime (OVC) in 2011; the 
Council on Foreign Relations in 2013; the Journal of Contemporary Criminal 
Justice in 2004; the Journal of Libertarian Studies in 1982; the Internet Journal of 
Criminology in 2010; the Howard Journal of Criminal Justice in 2004; the James 
A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy in 2013; the Journal of Offender 
Counseling, Services & Rehabilitation in 1981; Law, Culture and the Humanities 
in 2005; and Criminology and Criminal Justice in 2006.  
4. Comparison 
After collecting, organizing, reviewing, analyzing, and summarizing the 
research data on removals, prosecutions, sentencing, restitution, etc., the author 
detailed the results. The results of subsections one through three were 
summarized to test the hypothesis, and determine the feasibility of modeling a 
policy for implementing Mission 3’s own version of restitution (i.e., CR) as an 
enforcement strategy against criminal immigration recidivism. The upcoming 
section describes the results of this research. 
C. RESULTS 
Figures 7 and 8 highlight the main similarities between the immigration 
enforcement and the criminal justice systems; the similarities outweigh the 
differences, with ineligibility for release on bond, no right to an attorney at 
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government’s expense,93 and removal from the United States representing key 
variations. The research showed the criminal justice and the immigration 
enforcement systems’ relationship in terms of constitutional processes, the 
foundations for criminal and immigration laws’ treatment of non-citizens, the 
political climate’s demands and expectations from both systems, the effects of 
demands and expectations on enforcement priorities and outcome measures, 




Figure 7.  Basic Overview of the Immigration Enforcement Process for 
Most First Time Offenders. Criminal Immigration Recidivists 
Have Their Original Removal Orders Re-instated, and Do Not 
Undergo This Process Anew.94 
93 Immigration offenders do not receive legal representation/counsel at the government’s 
expense in immigration proceedings, unless mentally ill. See U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Civil Immigration Detention: Guidance for 
New Identification and Information-Sharing Procedures Related to Unrepresented Detainees with 
Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, April 2013), http://www.ice.gov/doclib /detention-reform/pdf/11063.1_current_id_ 
and_infosharing_detainess_mental_disorders.pdf. 
94 This illustration is just an overview; not all non-citizens are eligible for a hearing before an 
IJ—their eligibility depends on authorized status at the time of entry. Not included in this overview 
are other procedures in which no hearing occurs before an IJ, such as stipulated removals, 
voluntary returns, visa waiver removals, administrative removals, etc. Criminal immigration 
recidivists may be eligible for a hearing before a judge or asylum officer to determine whether fear 
of prosecution claims can be substantiated. 
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Figure 8.  The U.S. Federal Criminal Justice Process, a Basic 
Overview.95 
The research indicates that the vast majority of prosecutions for 
immigration violations are occurring along the southwest border region. Table 5 
highlights the five districts in FY 201296 with the highest prosecution rates for 
criminal immigration recidivists in the nation. The District of Arizona ranked first, 
followed by the Western and Southern Districts of Texas, the District of New 
Mexico, and the Southern District of California, respectively.  
On the other hand, and as shown in Figure 9, only the districts97 of 
Arizona, followed by Southern California, and Southern Texas, ranked as the 
highest for new criminal recidivists’ prosecutions. 
95 Not all steps apply in all cases, and additional steps may apply in others, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, “Victim Justice, A Brief Description of the Federal Criminal Justice Process,” May 
18, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/victim_assistance/a-brief-description-of-the-federal-
criminal-justice-process. 
96 As tabulated by the United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 
2008 through 2012 Datafiles, Quickfacts, 1. 
97 Based on the Bureau of Justice Statistics study; FY 2008 is the most recent study of this 
kind. 
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FY2012 ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY PROSECUTIONS 
 
District of Arizona 
(N=3,873) 
 
Western District of Texas 
(N=3,664) 
 
Southern District of Texas 
(N=3,387) 
 
District of New Mexico 
(N=1,907) 
Southern District of California 
(N=1,339) 
Table 5.   Top Five Districts Illegal Re-entry Offenders FY 2012.98  
98 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts. 
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Figure 9.  FY 2008 New Prosecutions for Criminal Recidivists in the 
Districts of Arizona Southern California, and Southern 
Texas.99  
Figure 10 highlights the offense-type characteristics of non-citizen 
offenders from 1985 to 2010 across the nation. In FY 2012, immigration offenses 
ranked first in the federal system, followed by drug offenses (see Figure 3 in 
Chapter I).100 In all federal cases in the top five districts, the particulars of the 
offense drove the sanction’s severity. As shown in Tables 6 through 10, drugs 
and immigration offenses carried the harshest sanctions (i.e., prison sentences in 
lieu of other sanctions).  
99 Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Federal Justice Statistics Program, Immigration Offenders in the 
Federal Justice System, 2010.”  
100 Schmitt and Dukes, “Overview of Federal Criminal Cases Fiscal Year 2012,” United 
States Sentencing Commission. Many cases are excluded from the statistics due to variables 
relating to the sentencing guidelines. 
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On the other hand, the bottom sections of Tables 6–10 also illustrate the 
offenses receiving other sanctions in lieu of prison in the same districts; as 
shown, restitution and fines are imposed together in a variety of cases, including 
immigration offenses. 
 
Figure 10.  Noncitizens Incarcerated in Federal Prison, by Offence Type, 
1985–2010.101  
101 Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Federal Justice Statistics Program, Immigration Offenders in the 
Federal Justice System, 2010.”  
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Table 6.   District of Arizona, FY 2012 Guideline Sentences.102 
102 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts. 
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Table 7.   District of Southern California, FY 2012 Guideline 
Sentences.103 
103 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts. 
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Table 8.   District of New Mexico, FY 2012 Guideline Sentences.104 
104 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts. 
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Table 9.   District of Texas Southern, FY 2012 Guideline Sentences.105  
105 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts. 
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Table 10.   District of Texas Western, FY 2012 Guideline Sentences.106  
In FY 2012, immigration offenders prosecuted nationwide were eligible for 
alternative sanctions (in lieu of prison) more than 90 percent of the time (see 
Figure 11), as was the case even when no minimum sentence term was 
specified in the sentencing guidelines.107  
106 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts. 
107 Zones A and B refer to sentencing zones in which no minimum monthly prison term is 
specified or is at least one but no more than six months, respectively. 
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Figure 11.  Imprisonment Rates of Offenders Eligible for Non-Prison 
Sentences in Selected Offense Types, FY 2012.108 
On the other hand, trends in nationwide imposition and collection of 
restitution have varied. Figure 12 shows a breakdown of criminal and civil 
restitution collections by the United States Attorneys Office (AUSO), Financial 
108 United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 2012 
Datafiles, Quickfacts. 
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Litigation Units (FLUs) from FY 2004 to FY 2010.109 Table 12 shows the percent 
of offenders returning to federal prison within three years of release by type of 
offense at release, and return, for the year 2008. 
 
Figure 12.  Restitution Collections Nationwide FY 2004–FY 2010.110  
109 “Data on this table excludes asset forfeitures. Collected amount includes payments 
received by the United States attorneys, the courts, and other agencies. Effective FY 2007, 
statistics were generated from the department-wide Consolidated Debt Collection System 
(CDCS). CDCS centralized all debt collection information from previously used debt collection 
systems,” Office of the United States Attorneys, “Victims’ Rights: Returning Money to Victims—
Restitution,” December 12, 2013, http://www.justice.gov/usao/briefing_room/vw/returning_ 
money_restitution.html. 
110 Office of the United States Attorneys, “Victims’ Rights: Returning Money to Victims—
Restitution.” 
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Table 11.   Percent of Offenders Returning to Federal Prison within 
Three Years of Release by Type of Offense at Release, and 
Return, 2008.111  
The results section provides a current overview regarding immigration 
offenders in the federal justice system; it described the top districts, as of 2010, 
where criminal immigration recidivists’ prosecutions are occurring. The section 
also described the increase in immigration offenses throughout the nation, and 
the types of sanction most likely to be imposed. Lastly, the results section 
provided a brief description of restitution collection trends across state and 
federal districts, and immigration offenders’ recidivism patterns overtime. 
The upcoming section discusses the limitations of employing the selected 
research design. 
111 Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Federal Justice Statistics Program, Immigration Offenders in the 
Federal Justice System, 2010.” 
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D. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH DESIGN  
Sample composition, data description, selection, interpretation, and self-
bias may have affected the research results.  
An important limitation of the research design is the sample composition 
itself. As shown on sentencing data, immigration offenders include citizens and 
non-citizens. Specifically, this study was narrowed to non-citizens previously 
convicted of a criminal offense and illegal re-entry after previous removal from 
the United States. From the data, it is unclear who is a non-citizen “criminal” due 
to a violation of a criminal statute, as opposed to a violation of immigration law, or 
both.  
It is also unclear what factor citizenship plays (if any) for those offenders 
who receive restitution as a sole sanction or in combination, but in lieu of a prison 
sentence (see Appendix C for a list of offenses in which restitution was imposed 
along with other sanctions at the national level). Research addressing these 
variables, and making these distinctions, is necessary. 
The author’s bias may have played a role in the design’s outcome, and 
subsequent recommendations as well. As an immigration enforcement officer, 
many key possibilities may have been overlooked. She also did not conduct any 
case studies on foreign nations’ use of restitution within their criminal justice or 
immigration enforcement systems.  
Other key limitations of the research design are the subject areas it did not 
cover; for example, variables, such as gender, economic status, educational 
attainment, race, ethnicity, age, etc., and their potential effects on behavior and 
desistance, were not addressed. It is unknown whether considering any of these 
variables would have affected the outcome of the research.  
The upcoming section discusses the findings of the research as an 
introduction to Chapter IV: Policy Development. 
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IV. POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
This section represents the core of the thesis. It begins by discussing the 
research findings to introduce a policy model for CR. The findings are presented 
at the beginning of this chapter to guide the reader in understanding the model’s 
foundations; current strategies and limitations are presented, followed by 
implementation steps, and possible challenges. 
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS  
Restitution is not regularly imposed as a sole sanction. Although restitution 
is said to be an effective means to reduce recidivism, it is mainly used as an 
“alternative sanction;” its use has been historically restricted or limited to certain 
offenses—such as theft, vandalism, property crimes—or to specific category of 
offenders (non-violent adult populations, and juveniles).112 Caputo argues that 
restitution’s origins explain its limited applicability to certain offenses and types of 
offenders: [Restitution] “can be used in response to violent crimes, but the 
difficulty of estimating the financial value of physical and emotional injuries and 
ancillary loss to victims has traditionally limited its use for victims of violent 
crimes. This is not to say violent and repeat offenders are always excluded.”113 
This statement raises an important point because the author’s definition of CR 
applies to violent and non-violent criminal immigration offenders. 
When applied to divert offenders from prison, restitution is said to be a 
cost-effective alternative.114 However, restitution’s operational cost-savings are 
minimal, because as currently used, it benefits the victim not the government.115 
This was an interesting key finding in the study. The author’s proposal for a CR 
policy model allows DHS to act on behalf of the victim (i.e., the taxpayers); as 
112 Caputo, Intermediate Sanctions in Corrections, ch. 7, 145. 
113 Ibid., 139. 
114 Ibid., 145. 
115 Ibid. 
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such, if Caputo’s argument is valid, CR’s operational cost-savings should be 
significant. 
On the other hand, in the few instances where imposed, fulfilling an order 
of restitution benefits the offender also, as restitution is not a criminal conviction 
per se, and as such, it removes the stereotype of a “criminal record.” However, 
criminal immigration recidivists are less likely to receive an alternative sanction, 
such as a fine or restitution than criminal recidivists.  
When restitution is imposed, sentencing data do not isolate the offenders’ 
criminal history, and citizenship status. For example, the data does not indicate 
whether the offender receiving restitution is a U.S. citizen charged with an 
immigration violation, such as alien smuggling, or whether the offender is an 
immigration recidivist without a criminal history, other than the immigration 
offense. Federal sentencing data on criminal recidivists, based on offense-type, 
include immigration violators, but data on criminal immigration recidivists does 
not include criminal recidivists.  
In other words, when prosecuted for illegal re-entry (a felony), criminal 
immigration recidivists fall under the “immigration offenses” category, but are 
categorized under other applicable category when prosecuted first for an offense 
other than immigration (i.e., drugs, fraud). As a result, it is unknown or difficult to 
determine whether illegal re-entry is the only criminal offense for which an 
offender has been prosecuted. The overlaps and omissions in the data may help 
explain the steady recidivism rates seen in one category, but not in another.  
Nationwide sentencing data does not include recidivism patterns based on 
the imposition of restitution; neither does the data from the top five districts for 
prosecution of criminal immigration recidivists. The likelihood of reoffending after 
restitution is imposed, and the rate at which offenders’ recidivate is unknown. 
However, the findings showed that criminal immigration recidivists returned to 
federal custody for a new offense at a higher rate than criminal recidivists (see 
Table 11 in Chapter III); yet, it was shown that prison is the most common 
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sanction for this population, not alternative sanctions, such as restitution. 
Nevertheless, the variables affecting the rate of return to prison between citizens 
and non-citizens remain unknown. 
Lastly, the data does not indicate the number of cases transferred 
between jurisdictions from other regions. This practice may significantly skew 
prosecution, conviction, and sentencing numbers, and thus, affect the research 
findings. 
1. Expected Findings 
Figure 11 (in Chapter III) showed that in 2012, over 90 percent of 
immigration offenders sentenced to prison were eligible for non-prison 
sentences. This finding helps validate some of the author’s assumptions. 
Although eligible for other sanctions, prison continues to be the option of 
choice for criminal immigration recidivists, but why? Sentences for illegal re-entry 
after removal by an aggravated felon or criminal immigration recidivists have 
historically ranged, on average, from a few days to up to 19 months;116 four-fifths 
of convicted immigration offenders receive a prison sentence, with half 
sentenced to 15 months or more.”117 
However, if over 90 percent of immigration offenders are eligible for non-
prison sentences, cannot be placed on probation or parole due to their 
citizenship status, are not being treated or rehabilitated in any way to prevent 
them from re-offending, and are not being fined as often as allowed under the 
law (not nearly at the same rate as other offenders), why not try a new 
approach? 
116 United States Sentencing Commission, “Sentence Length in Each Primary Offense 
Category,” U. S. Sentencing Commission’s 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics–
Table 13 (Online).” 
117 Ibid. 
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If restitution is an available alternative, and its imposition is not legally 
restricted to a specific population, why not incorporate it into the immigration 
enforcement system to test its cost-savings potential within that population?  
2. Surprising Findings 
Restitution is not a novel proposition against immigration offenses. That is, 
restitution is currently a sentencing option for criminal immigration violators; 
however, as mentioned, and as shown in Appendix C, it appears that restitution 
is imposed very rarely in illegal re-entry cases (only in about .002 percent). 
Nevertheless, this number shows that the feasibility for implementing a CR 
scheme within immigration enforcement does exist. 
An unexpected finding was the amount of restitution collected by the 
federal government. For FY 2010 alone, the FLUs in the USAOs collected over 
$2.8 billion in criminal debt collections, and $3.8 billion as a result of civil debt 
collections efforts, respectively.118 However, the data did not offer a breakdown 
of how much any of these totals came directly from the offenders.119 
In general, however, the research findings support developing and 
implementing a modified version of restitution—i.e., CR—into Mission 3’s 
“prevention of unlawful immigration” goals and objectives against criminal 
immigration recidivists. Introducing a CR policy model is feasible due to the 
similarities—in terms of processes—between the criminal and immigration 
enforcement systems.  
As proposed in this thesis, restitution would continue to benefit the “victim” 
(i.e., the taxpayer); it will also open the door for research in this area of 
alternative sanctions and recidivism, but within criminal immigration recidivist 
populations. Although current studies and data collection practices have 
118 Office of the United States Attorneys, “Victims’ Rights: Returning Money to Victims—
Restitution.” 
119 Ibid. As opposed to victim’s or government’s compensation funds.  
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limitations, the findings do not prevent the development of a CR policy model for 
testing or for further research.  
B. CURRENT PRACTICE AND LIMITATIONS 
DHS (and ultimately the taxpayers) incurs all the costs associated with re-
enforcing the removal process. This process includes re-arrest, re-apprehension, 
detention, prosecution, and removal, among other logistics. Title 8 U.S.C. 1326 
makes unlawful re-entry a criminal felony, which is the fastest growing 
immigration charge. Federal courts located in 11 cities on the U.S./Mexico border 
handle more than 80 percent of the people arrested on immigration charges.120 
To give a reader an additional frame of reference, Figure 13 shows the FY 2011 
USAOs criminal workload for the entire nation. As shown, immigration offenses 
represent the majority of prosecutions at almost half the total.  
However, and as previously mentioned, not all unlawful re-entry cases 
involve non-citizens convicted of previous criminal offenses. That is, some non-
citizens charged with illegal re-entry may be immigration recidivists, but not 
criminal immigration recidivists. For a non-citizen to fit the author’s description of 
a criminal immigration recidivist—and thus be eligible for CR—he must have 
been previously removed, and have a prior criminal conviction for a violent or 
non-violent offense—not just the criminal immigration conviction.  
120 Based on United States Sentencing Commission, Illegal Re-entry Offenses, 2008 through 
2012 Datafiles, Quickfacts. 
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Figure 13.  USAOs FY2011 Criminal Case Workload.121  
The author assumes that intermingling offense categories may serve to 
make enforcement statistics look productive for funding justification purposes; 
yet, this approach hinders scholarly research, and interest in developing 
potentially efficient crime-control strategies.  
Currently, a lack of consistency exists across the nation in prosecuting 
both criminal and non-criminal immigration recidivists. The USAO decides which 
cases to accept for prosecution; those rejected are re-processed for removal (at 
the government’s expense) without further consequences for the determined 
recidivist.122  
121 U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorneys FY 2013 Performance Budget 
Congressional Submission. 
122 “No further consequences,” as used in this context, means other than the 
acknowledgement of possible fines and confinement for unauthorized re-entry after removal. 
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The USAO has the power to charge, and federal magistrates have the 
option to impose, restitution, and fines during illegal re-entry prosecutions and 
sentencing phases (for criminal and non-criminals cases), but this option is rarely 
imposed; restitution’s limited use appears symbolic rather than punitive. 
According to the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, out of 28,500 cases in 
which the primary offense was immigration, no fines or restitution were ordered in 
98.5 percent of all cases. Restitution without fines was ordered for 49 defendants 
(or in 0.2 percent of cases),123 while fines without restitution were imposed in 1.3 
percent of total cases. Fines and restitution were ordered in less than 0.05 
percent of cases.  
Although the Sourcebook lists ‘immigration” as the primary offense 
triggering restitution or a fine, it does not specify the kind of immigration violation 
incurred. That is, the data does not differentiate between illegal re-entry after 
deportation of aggravated felony cases (i.e., violent and non-violent criminal 
recidivists), as opposed to cases involving illegal re-entry offenders without a 
prior criminal history. 
Another limit of current practice is the lack of available information on 
collection protocols. The USAOs collect restitution payments from private 
individuals and entities ordered in federal court, and owed to the United States 
and non-federal parties. USAOs are required to enforce restitution orders on 
behalf of all federal crime victims.124 However, due to the limited number of 
cases in which restitution is actually imposed (or along with fines), answers to 
key questions remain unclear. For instance, information on compliance with 
 
123 University at Albany, State University of New York, “Sourcebook of Criminal Justice 
Statistics Online, Table 15 (Fines and Restitution Ordered in U.S. District Courts for U.S. 
Sentencing Commission Guideline Cases, by Primary Office, Fiscal Year 2010),” accessed May 
30, 2013, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5322010.pdf. 
124 U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorneys FY 2013 Performance Budget 
Congressional Submission (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, United States 
Attorney’s Office), February 11, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy13-usa-
justification.pdf. 
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restitution or fine orders is lacking for criminal and non-criminal immigration 
recidivist cases, it is not clear how restitution payments are collected and 
disbursed to victims—if at all—and when. It is also unclear what the 
consequences for failure to pay are, if any, or how much variation exists between 
jurisdictions across the country. Figure 14 shows an illustration of USAOs 
restitution collection trends from 2004 through 2011. Overall, civil restitution 
collections surpass criminal collections; whether the differences are a result of 
lack of compliance by criminal offenders is unknown.  
With a high degree of awareness regarding these limitations, the author 
introduces the CR policy model developmental and implementation phases. By 
doing so, she expects to show how these data and statistical limitations can be 
overcome. 
The upcoming sections focus on the third research question, what 
recommendations or core factor modifications are needed to design, develop, 
and implement a CR strategy within the immigration enforcement system?  
 64 
 
Figure 14.  USAOs Restitution Collections FY 2004 to FY 2011.125  
C. MODEL DEVELOPMENT  
The model development section discusses the steps necessary to develop 
and implement a CR policy model within Mission 3, designed after restitution’s 
ideals as an alternative sanction in the criminal justice system. It explored 
whether a CR scheme could allow DHS to transfer the fiscal burden of re-
enforcement to the recidivist legitimately, thereby, reducing operational costs and 
lowering recidivism.  
125 U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorneys FY 2013 Performance Budget 
Congressional Submission. 
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The thesis sought to research the answers to the following research 
questions in support of developing and implementing the model strategy against 
criminal immigration recidivism. 
• In general, what is restitution’s utility for the criminal justice system?  
• Given the similarities between the criminal justice and immigration 
enforcement systems, to what extent is the addition of a CR Policy 
Model to Mission 3’s “prevention of unlawful immigration” goals and 
objectives feasible? 
• Assuming that adding a CR Policy Model to Mission 3 is feasible, 
what strategic recommendations or core factor modifications would 
be required to develop and implement it?  
To summarize, the answer to the first question—restitution’s utility for the 
American criminal justice system—is as follows. Restitution is one of many 
sanctions used to deter and prevent crime along with retribution, incapacitation, 
just desserts, and punishment. Restitution focuses on the victim. As currently 
imposed and enforced, restitution is said to restore the victim, while allowing the 
offender to accept responsibility for actions perpetrated.126 This process triggers 
a sort of psychological response that helps an offender desist from future criminal 
behavior.127  
The answer to the second question—restitution’s feasibility as a strategy 
within Mission 3—is as follows. The processes involved in the criminal justice 
and immigration enforcement systems are intertwined. At the criminal level, 
immigration recidivists enjoy the constitutional and due process rights provided to 
citizens since the issue(s) at stake involve the depravation of life or liberty at the 
hands of the government.128 At the immigration level (also federal), a number of 
constitutional protections apply as well (i.e., the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 14th 
126 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Handbook on Restorative Justice 
Programmes” (2006), May 27, 2013, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/06-56290_ 
Ebook.pdf. 
127 Ruback and Bergstrom, “Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice: Purposes, Effects, and 
Implications,” 242–273; U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute 
of Justice “Promising Practices in Restorative Justice: Restitution,” May 18, 2013, http://www.nij. 
gov/nij/topics/courts/restorative-justice/promising-practices/restitution.htm. 
128 Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, “Rights, Privileges, and Duties 
of Aliens.” 
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amendment rights),129 except recidivists do not go through the immigration court 
system upon each apprehension; instead, the original order of removal stands.  
During immigration proceedings, the right to an attorney at government’s 
expense is not automatic, nor is a criminal immigration recidivist eligible to be 
released on bond.130 Normally, the final outcome is the offender’s removal. 
Nonetheless, the similarities outweigh the differences, and serve to support 
introducing a CR policy model as an immigration enforcement strategy. 
The design, development, and recommendations for implementing a CR 
model will serve to answer the final research question; that is, having determined 
restitution’s utility within the criminal justice system, and its feasibility as an 
intervention against criminal immigration recidivism, what is the overall strategic 
approach? As a start, the author proposes deploying a pilot CR program. 
DHS should implement CR as an enforcement tool against criminal 
immigration recidivism in lieu of prosecution. Implementing CR will serve to shift 
the financial burden of reinforcement to the recidivist, and thereby, free DHS 
resources to increase its investigative personnel, expand enforcement and 
intelligence programs, detention capacity, air fleet, and other enforcement-related 
programs. CR is an unconventional approach to criminal immigration 
enforcement, and it will explore an untested enforcement alternative.131  
Failing to implement CR as enforcement tool will continue to send the 
wrong global message; an implicit unspoken message indicating that the 
revolving door for criminal immigration recidivists will always be open because 
129 Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, “Rights, Privileges, and Duties 
of Aliens.” 
130 There are legal exceptions, such as humanitarian, medical, etc., or if the government is 
unable to remove the offender for other reasons. 
131 Although not discussed as part of this thesis, DHS’ “consequence delivery system” also 
aims to reduce recidivism among criminal non-citizens. For an overview of the program, see 
Testimony of Michael J. Fisher, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 
Security: “Does Administrative Amnesty Harm Our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational 
Control of the Border? October 4, 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/10/04/written-testimony-
cbp-house-homeland-security-subcommittee-border-and-maritime. 
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the “threat” of prosecution, longer sentences, and fines is just that, a threat. 
Current enforcement strategies need diversity to affect this determined 
population, but must benefit the taxpayers (self-sustain).  
D. DETAILS 
CR involves granting a criminal immigration recidivist the option of 
covering the costs associated with removal, instead of prosecuting for illegal Re-
entry. CR in lieu of prosecution is not a “benefit.” CR does not expunge or voids 
an offenders’ criminal record, nor does its acceptance reduce any time in a 
criminal sentence.  
Specifically, CR allows an offender to reimburse the taxpayers (through 
DHS) the costs of reinforcement; unlike traditional restitution—where payment is 
made to a victim(s)—in CR cases, DHS would represent the collective. CR would 
serve to pay for an offender’s pre-removal detention expenses, while in DHS 
custody, and outbound transportation costs to the country of origin.  
CR will consist of an agreement between the offender and DHS, which 
among other stipulations, lists the amount to be paid by the offender, and 
applicable deadlines. CR award determinations will be executed 60–90 days 
before an offender’s release from federal, state, or local custody, or within 48 
hours of arrest, if the apprehension occurred during the course of enforcement 
operations.  
CR will be collected upon signing of the agreement, which will be no more 
than a page in length, in a language that the offender can understand. CR costs 
will be determined by current detention rates charged to DHS,132 and carriers’ 
charges and fees to the destination country.  
132 Although daily bed-rates vary by jurisdiction, the National Immigration Forum (NIF) 
reported that as of August 2012, the current detention bed-rates charged to DHS was, on 
average, $164.00. National Immigration Forum, “The Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway 
Costs for Immigration Detention Do Not Add Up to Sensible Policies,” 2012, 2, http://www. 
immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/MathofImmigrationDetention.pdf. *Travel expenses vary by 
transportation method and carrier. 
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Exceptions, waivers, and exempted cases will be determined on a case-
by-case basis, although limiting CR’s intended purpose. Overall, these 
procedures aim to establish consistency and uniformity across immigration 
enforcement field operations. 
E. SELECTION AND ELIGIBILITY 
The CR pilot program will follow a simple yet methodical course; it is to be 
implemented in phases. Phase I could be piloted with the non-violent criminal 
immigration recidivist category first to test the economic impact on the offender, 
i.e., compliance with U.S. laws in the form of lower recidivism rates.  
Depending on the success of the pilot program, Phase II would then 
include violent criminal immigration recidivists encountered in correctional 
institutions, and during enforcement operations. Other phases may be 
implemented as needed. 
Just as the number of apprehensions and prosecutions is seen as a 
“victory” against the fight on illegal immigration, so too can successful 
implementation of a CR program. Figure 15 offers an overview of the proposed 
CR pilot program model (starting at 1 clockwise).  




Figure 15.  Mission 3’s CR Pilot Program Model Overview. 
F. PILOT PROGRAM: IMPLEMENTING CIVIL RESTITUTION 
1. Preliminary Procedures 
During the CR pilot implementation period, non-violent criminal recidivist 
cases will be identified by each immigration enforcement jurisdiction. Interviews 
will be conducted to explain the CR agreement, and place special emphasis on 
the consequences for violating the terms of the agreement, such as the inability 
to receive a refund for any monies submitted to DHS up to that point. The 
preliminary interview will also serve to confirm the individuals’ economic solvency 
to comply with the CR terms, and to secure travel documents. Indigence claims 
and waiver requests will also be addressed at this stage.  
If the individual declines or opts out of CR, DHS will withdraw the CR 
grant, and at its discretion, may then decide to pursue prosecution as an 






This last option, of course, defeats the purpose of CR, but it is one of the 
unavoidable risks of implementing this approach.  
2. Civil Restitution Awards  
During a follow-up interview, the amount due will be provided to the 
individual. The amount will cover transportation costs to the country of origin, and 
projected costs of days spent at the detention facility, calculated at then daily 
rates charged to the government. The amount is subject to change if payment is 
not submitted to DHS within the projected travel or departure date.  
Individuals will be provided with different options for payment, which may 
include submitting payments via kiosks placed in detention facilities (similar 
technology already exists for inmates and detainees to receive commissary 
funds);133 other options may also include submitting payments by telephone with 
a credit card, by money order, or cash paid in person at a DHS field office. 
(These last options obviously involve a third party.) 
3. Travel and Notification Procedures 
Once payment has been secured, travel arrangements will be finalized. 
Transportation carriers will be notified as per current regulations, but following a 
new protocol that identifies the traveler as a “removal at self-expense.” This 
classification will signal to the transportation carrier that the individual is a self-
paying customer, while at the same time allowing DHS to comply with notification 
requirements. 
DHS staff will escort the offender until the last port of departure from the 
United States (witness departure), and in unavoidable cases in which it is 
necessary to make a connection, arrange for staff in the connecting destination 
to meet the offender to ensure that travel continues as planned. Interestingly, this 
process is currently in place for voluntary departure cases under “safeguards 
133 Detainees are persons held in custody due to civil violations (i.e., immigration detention); 
inmates are persons held in custody for convictions due to violations of criminal laws. 
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(VRs).”134 Continuing these partial escort duties may serve to quell enforcement 
staff criticisms regarding their national security mission. Nonetheless, this option 
may not serve to assuage any safety or security concerns related to the criminal 
immigration recidivists traveling without DHS escorts to the final country of origin.  
4. Conditions  
Moving up from the target category during the pilot period (i.e., conviction 
of a violent offense), would serve to automatically disqualify a CR recipient or 
previously eligible offenders. 
In addition, and as currently practiced, the CR recipient must be an active 
participant in obtaining travel documents as a “private citizen.” 
As soon as an order of CR is executed, the offender’s information will be 
forwarded to the Department of State (DOS), and DHS personnel stationed 
abroad for record keeping and follow up. Periodic checks on the offender during 
the pilot period, and after, will be conducted with the cooperation of local law 
enforcement contacts, other sister agencies, and intelligence gathering tools.  
CR agreement conditions could include unannounced interviews by DHS 
personnel stationed throughout the world, which would allow DHS enforcement 
staff to track the offenders’ location, even though, legally, the U.S. government 
has no jurisdiction over foreign nationals abroad. Tracking individuals will 
possibly not violate any privacy or international laws for two reasons, 1) 
unannounced visits will be stated as stipulations in the CR agreement, and 2) the 
U.S. C. Title 8—Aliens and Nationality, and Title 8 of the United States Code § 
1104—Powers and Duties of Secretary of State135 require removed non-citizens 
to remain outside the United States for a certain period of time after removal, 
134 “Voluntary departure under safeguards” refers to individuals who may be permitted to 
leave the country at their own expense, under monitored conditions, in lieu of removal 
proceedings before an IJ 8 USC § 1229 c–Voluntary Departure. 
135 The U.S.C. provides rulemaking authority to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 
CFR Title 22 Part 40, Subpart J—Aliens Previously Removed Addresses Immigration Recidivists 
(Criminal and Non-Criminals), 22 CFR §40.91—Certain Aliens Previously Removed lists the 
exact bars to re-entry into the U.S. after removal. 
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which is required to be eligible to apply for permission to re-enter. Tracking an 
offender’s location will serve to confirm the persons’ place of residence, although 
the burden of prove is always on the applicant.  
Moreover, if the offender immigrates to another country, DHS can chose 
to verify the location via current databases or through personnel stationed in the 
receiving country. This process may appear cumbersome, and to place an 
additional burden on DHS staff to track and report; however, the point of this pilot 
period is to make adjustments as needed to test the strategy fully. 
5. Information Sharing: Data Transmission, Quality, and Integrity 
Once travel arrangements are finalized, the information will be 
simultaneously submitted to DHS enforcement staff abroad who will then meet 
the individual upon arrival in the receiving country, alongside local immigration 
officials. This process will allow DHS officials to verify the citizen’s arrival, obtain 
fingerprints, verify place of residence, and obtain other pertinent information for 
tracking purposes. Figure 16 shows the proposed CR implementation model 
strategy.  
Perhaps the most difficult part of the pilot implementation will be logistics. 
Advanced technological systems will be needed to maintain accurate data 
records. CR’s ultimate outcomes will be measured by the incidence of criminal 
immigration recidivism pre- and post-implementation within the selected 
population. As shown in Figure 16, the bulk of the strategy is centered on data 




Figure 16.  Mission 3 Proposed CR Implementation Model. 
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6. Costs 
The expected operational expenses related to the CR pilot implementation 
are minimal; at a maximum, expenses envisioned by the CR pilot implementation 
will include the creation of new forms, public affairs campaigns, equipment 
upgrades, and synchronization or acquisition of technological equipment to 
support metrics; supplies acquisition, staff-training—on both eligibility, collection, 
processing, tracking and liaison protocols—may also be included.  
Expenses related to tracking the offenders abroad, including additional 
staff, informants, etc., are possibilities that need to be considered.  
7. Outcome Measures: Collaborative Oversight 
To measure CR’s success, a new set of metrics will need to be developed, 
which will replace the current process of measuring success based on volume. In 
other words, CR could be measured not only by completed removals paid for by 
the offenders (and not the taxpayer), but by recidivism trends.  
Once individuals are removed, a dedicated CR unit will need to be created 
to focus solely on handling the target population. During the pilot period, 
enforcement staff already covering the receiving country or region will fulfill 
staffing needs. After the pilot period is over, staffing adjustments can be made as 
needed.  
To measure CR’s impact on the target population, an independent 
auditing entity, such as the GAO, or the DHS OIG, should conduct a preliminary 
survey 12 months after pilot implementation. This time period is ideal to identify 
any issues that need to be immediately addressed, and any potential future long-
term problems.  
The preliminary survey will measure CR’s impact on criminal immigration 
recidivists on the following dimensions: rate of acceptance, fiscal compliance, 
time period between grant and acceptance of a CR agreement and removal, type 
of eligible cases processed (i.e., types of crimes), issues relating to CR case 
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processing and logistics, CR’s system set-up and logistic issues domestically and 
abroad, best practices, unexpected results, and other issues. 
The DHS Statistical Tracking Unit (STU) will distribute, collect, analyze, 
and forward the results of the surveys to DHS management for questions, 
comments, and for dissemination to appropriate executive and legislative bodies. 
DHS enforcement and respective agencies’ mission support staff will be 
responsible for providing the information to DHS STU. The information will be 
obtained from databases currently used for enforcement purposes, such as the 
alien booking and removal modules.136 As an alternative, during the pilot period, 
separate divisions could be created within the bond collection units of each field 
immigration enforcement office; these units will be responsible for handling only 
CR reporting to DHS STU.  
The final measure of success for the CR pilot program will expand on the 
preliminary survey, but will also include metrics for attempted or confirmed 
recidivism data by the end of the 24-month period. Attempted recidivism data will 
include any attempt by a previously removed criminal non-citizen at illegally re-
entering the United States, but prevented from doing so due to successful CR’s 
tracking or enforcement efforts. (The author expects tracking alerts and 
information to be disseminated through intelligence and secure channels.) 
Other outcome measures include recidivism rates post-CR implementation 
among the target population; indigence claims and outcomes, rates of status quo 
cases, ongoing logistics issues throughout the CR pilot period (i.e., forms 
development), and other reported miscellaneous issues that affected or may 
136 The Bonds Online System (eBONDS) is an ICE)web-based application used primarily by 
surety agents and ICE ERO to facilitate the ICE immigration bond management process The 
basic function of eBONDS is to allow surety companies to post immigration bonds online for 
aliens that ERO has determined are eligible for release on bond. eBONDS is linked to the Bond 
Management Information System-Web (BMIS Web) and the ENFORCE Alien Removal Module 
(EARM) to complete the bond application process, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Information and Customs Enforcement, “Immigration Bond,” March 7, 2014, http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/news/library/forms/pdf/i352.pdf. 
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affect the short- or long-term success of CR as an effective enforcement tool 
against criminal immigration recidivism.  
Depending on the results of the outcomes measured, policymakers will be 
able to determinate the need to create a nationwide centralized CR account 
within the Treasury’s Immigration Enforcement Account,137 or allow each DHS 
field office to create individual CR accounts. Alternatively, create dedicated or 
individual field processing and reporting units, determine the need for additional 
staff, the timeline for the next audit, to gauge the cost-benefits and effectiveness 
of CR (and iterate accordingly), or eliminate CR all together. 
The upcoming section discusses the impact that a CR scheme may have 
on immigration enforcement across various domains. 
G. ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGES 
To reiterate, the term criminal immigration recidivists refers to 
undocumented non-citizens previously removed due to a criminal conviction; 
however, illegal immigration recidivism, in general, includes both criminal and 
non-criminal persons. The focus of this thesis is on the former, since more 
enforcement, harsher penalties, longer sentences, and so on, have not reduced 
recidivism among criminal immigration recidivists as much as expected. So what 
can be done?  
The thesis validated several assumptions regarding the development and 
implementation of a pilot CR model program within Mission 3: (1) that it was 
feasible to implement a CR scheme within the immigration enforcement system, 
(2) that CR would serve to shift the costs of repeat enforcement from the 
taxpayers to the recidivists; thereby, serving to self-sustain Mission 3’s goals and 
objectives, and (3) that as a result of transferring the costs of reinitiating the 
removal process from DHS to the recidivists, CR’s outcomes will result in lower 
rates of criminal immigration recidivism. 
137 INA § 280 (b) (1)—Collection of Penalties and Expenses. 
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Policymakers responsible for enacting immigration enforcement legislation 
currently have options at their disposal. So why should they look at CR as a 
strategic option? In addition to the arguments expressed heretofore, the author 
would argue they should do so because CR would benefit both parties, the 
taxpayer and the criminal immigration recidivist. Current strategies do not seek to 
achieve this balance. 
Examples of policymakers who should be interested in CR are found 
within the House Judiciary and Homeland Security Committees responsible for 
homeland security, border security, and immigration enforcement such as: the 
House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security; the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement; the House of 
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, 
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, and other relevant  
committees.  
However, current options—besides prosecution and removal—include 
amending the INA to increase penalties for illegal re-entry after removal, 
implementing a consistent and uniform system for imposing penalties against 
criminal immigration recidivists, and aggressively enforcing the collection of fines. 
Others include aggressively and consistently imposing economic sanctions on 
foreign states that do not prevent removed citizens from returning to the United 
States without authorization, limiting or suspending visa issuance to 
uncooperative governments,138 etc. These latter options are powers conferred to 
the Attorney General, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary of State under the 
INA.139 Although currently available and sometimes used, these options place, 
albeit directly or indirectly, all accountability for compliance with the law on the 
U.S. taxpayer, and not necessarily on the offender.  
138 INA § 243 (c) (1) (d)—Penalties Related to Removal.  
139 INA § 103—Powers and Duties of the Attorney General and the Commissioner—INA 
§104—Powers and Duties of the Secretary of State. 
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Domestic and international governmental and non-governmental, human 
rights, non-profit and faith-based organizations, such as the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC); the Organization of American States 
(OAS); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; the ACLU; Human Rights 
First (HRF); the Women’s Refugee Commission (WRC); the ABA; scholars, and 
many others, would certainly be interested in the CR approach to manage 
criminal immigration recidivists.  
Homeland security articles written or published by the ABA in 2004; 
Stephen H. Legomsky, “The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric 
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms”; Mark Dow, “Designed to Punish: 
Immigrant Detention and Deportation”; Donald Kerwin and Serena Yi-Ying Lin, 
“Immigrant Detention: Can ICE Meet Its Legal Imperatives and Case 
Management Responsibilities?”; Bridget Kessler, “In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing  
. . . No Problem? A Closer Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process 
Standards of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”; Geoffrey 
Heeren, “Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention”; Sarah 
Gryll, “Immigration Detention Reform: No Band-Aid Desired”; Human Rights First, 
“Jails and Jumpsuits: Transforming the U.S. Immigration Detention System-A 
Two Year Review”; Karen Tumlin, Linton Joaquin, and Ranjana Natarajan, “A 
Broken System: Confidential Reports Reveal Failures in U.S. Detention Centers”; 
the ACLU of Arizona, “In Their Own Words, Enduring Abuse in Arizona 
Immigration Detention Center”; and the ACLU of Georgia, “Prisoners of Profit, 
Immigrants, and Detention in Georgia,” have argued that criminal non-citizens’ 
due process and civil rights are violated when they are prosecuted for illegal re-
entry after deportation. In their views, since criminal non-citizens have already 
served a period of incarceration for a criminal offense, prosecuting and 
incarcerating them for illegal re-entry is unconstitutional. In essence, the claim is 
that prosecuting criminal recidivists after they have served a criminal sentence is 
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tantamount to double jeopardy in violation of the 5th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.140  
As a result, these groups, institutions, and individuals may welcome CR, 
and may even consider it a best practice, because it would limit the use of 
prosecution in illegal re-entry cases. 
1. Possible Advantages 
On the other hand, implementing a CR pilot program has numerous 
advantages. It may potentially decrease immigration recidivism, especially 
criminal immigration recidivism rates, reduce reinforcement costs at 
government’s expense, and open the path to research on restitutions’ behavioral 
effects on criminal immigration recidivists, in violent and non-violent populations. 
Such research will serve conclusively to correlate the psychological effects on 
behavior across criminal populations brought upon by government-imposed 
financial responsibilities.  
Importantly, CR can be applied retroactively, which thus frees detention 
space for violent criminal immigration violators (i.e., recidivists and non-
recidivists). Doing so will serve to garner support from the public, policymakers, 
foreign states, the prison and transportation industries, as well as from DHS 
enforcement staff, immigrant advocacy groups, anti-immigrant organizations, and 
others. 
Although limited in depth and scope, the literature on restitution’s effect as 
a behavior modifier indicates that restitution is effective in lowering recidivism 
because it serves a rehabilitative purpose, as well as to hold offenders 
accountable for their behavior.141 Cares, Hoskins, and Ruback “argue that 
restitution and other economic sanctions are popular because of the goals they 
140 Judith Greene and Alexis Mazón, Privately Operated Federal Prisons for Immigrants: 
Expensive. Unsafe. Unnecessary (Brooklyn, NY: Justice Strategies, 2012), http://www.justice 
strategies.org/sites/default/files/publications/Privately%20Operated%20Federal%20Prisons%20fo
r%20Immigrants%209-13-12%20FNL.pdf. 
141 Caputo, Intermediate Sanctions in Corrections, ch. 7, ch 10. 
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serve. The authors posit that, “In recent years [economic sanctions] have 
become more common because they serve multiple criminal justice system 
goals: (a) having the offender offset some of the costs of prosecution and 
corrections, (b) restoring victims, (c) allowing for cheaper alternatives to 
incarceration, and (d) meeting the traditional objectives of punishment, 
deterrence, and rehabilitation. If these goals are being realized, offenders who 
pay their ordered economic sanctions should be less likely to recidivate.”142 
CR aims to reduce immigration enforcement operations reinforcement 
costs, not to increase them. After all, it is one of the general advantages in 
support of restitution. Caputo emphasizes this point when discussing restitution’s 
cost effectiveness. She argues, “Restitution is inexpensive to administer 
compared to most other sanctions, including probation, parole, imprisonment, 
boot camps, and halfway houses. This is especially true when offenders 
successfully complete restitution.”143  
Another advantage of CR is that it will require minimal organizational 
changes, in terms of personnel; at least during the pilot period, the need for 
additional enforcement personnel is unforeseen. DHS mission support staff 
already responsible for arranging removal arrangements, and collecting bonds, 
and staff responsible for non-citizens’ transportation to immigration detention 
facilities, can manage CR collection and pre-removal duties. However, CR will 
require adaptation to a new organizational culture, due to its unconventional 
approach to enforcement. 
2. Possible Risks 
The risks of implementing CR within the immigration enforcement system 
are many. CR may result in an increase in both types of immigration recidivism 
(criminal and non-criminal) due to misconceptions about its intended purpose; 
that is, some offenders may interpret CR to mean that the only penalty for the 
142 Cares, Hoskins, and Ruback, “Economic Sanctions and Recidivism.” 
143 Caputo, Intermediate Sanctions in Corrections, ch. 7, 145. 
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offense of illegal re-entry after removal is payment of reinforcement costs. As a 
result, the CR agreement must clearly emphasize that this interpretation is not 
the case. 
Regardless of how many recidivists accept CR’s terms and conditions, the 
status quo may remain due to indigence claims; retaining the status quo, of 
course, will defeat the purpose of this strategic option, and possibly result in 
additional reinforcement costs (i.e., if DHS decides to prosecute). On the other 
hand, if CR is accepted, but defaulted on at the last minute—or declined from the 
start—DHS will have to decide whether to begin prosecution efforts, or just 
proceed with removal at its expense. This situation is a very likely and common 
scenario, but one that does not differ from situations in which non-criminal, non-
recidivists, immigration detainees remain in detention after the granting of a 
bond, due to their inability to post it; the offenders’ inability to pay does not 
prevent the granting of a bond. CR should be approached in this same manner.  
An offender’s financial inability should not prevent the government from 
offering or granting CR. In fact, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 
(MVRA) changed the federal restitution statutes since the Victim Witness 
Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), which it amended.144 As a result, “perhaps the 
most significant amendment to the restitution statutes in MVRA was the addition 
to § 3664 of a phrase that previously had only occurred in mandatory restitution 
statutes for specific Title 18 offenses. The MVRA added § 3664(f)(1)(A) that 
provides: ‘In each order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each 
victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and 
without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant, 
(emphasis added).’”145 Since DHS is to act on behalf of the “victims” (i.e., the 
taxpayers) for the purposes of the CR strategy, the author believes the general 
144 The MVRA was actually Title II of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Public Law 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214(1996). The MVRA was effective April 24, 1996,” As 
stated in the United States Attorneys’ Bulletin, “An Update on Restitution Issues,” 2003, 15. 
145 Ibid. 
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language of the MVRA and the VWPA applies—even though immigration 
offenses, per se, are not listed in Title 18.146 
On the contrary, waving CR for humanitarian or special circumstances 
(i.e., medical emergencies), can be an option in limited cases, but should not be 
the norm.  
Another risk of implementing CR could be difficulties or delays in obtaining 
travel documents from the country of nationality. Not being in possession of a 
travel document (or not having the ability to obtain one promptly) can be grounds 
for CR ineligibility; this caveat will severely restrict or limit CR’s intended purpose 
however. Travel document delays will defeat or diminish CR’s effectiveness, 
especially if a criminal immigration recidivist has abided by the terms of the 
agreement; such delays will extend an offender’s detention period in DHS 
custody pending removal. However, DHS may utilize its power to issue sanctions 
against countries that refuse to issue travel documents to its citizens for removal 
purposes.147 This authority should be exercised as a matter of routine since 
criminal immigration recidivism is a national security matter, even though is 
categorized as a lower priority. 
Another risk of implementation—as proposed in this document, is the 
unknown or projected operational enforcement cost savings, if any. This data will 
not be available at least until the mid-term and final surveys are completed. CR is 
expected to reduce DHS enforcement expenses among the target population, but 
it is difficult to project the short-term and long-term savings in terms of dollar 
amounts, which is both an advantage, and one of its caveats. Although CR 
operational expenses are expected to be minimal, it is difficult to project exact 
enforcement expenditures unless the pilot program is deployed first, and its 
outcomes then measured. 
146 Legal Information Institute, “18 U.S. Code Part I—“Crimes,” Cornell University Law 
School, November 16, 2012, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/part-I. 
147 See INA § 243 (c) (1) (d)—Penalties Related to Removal; INA § 103—Powers and Duties 
of the Attorney General and the Commissioner; and INA §104—Powers and Duties of the 
Secretary of State. 
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Infrastructure constraints in the receiving country can limit or nullify CR’s 
expected outcomes. The lack of cooperation from the host government, and 
unexpected costs can all affect CR’s full implementation success, and CR’s 
influence in lowering criminal immigration recidivism. Although speculation or 
projected estimates are possible statistical approaches, the author chose not to 
make any premature speculations due to the significant logistical variations 
involved in her proposed strategy. 
Data collection at the end of the CR pilot period could prove to be a 
challenge as well. Data quality and integrity, timeliness, processing uniformity, 
recordkeeping and maintenance, etc., may require an extended period of time to 
develop, assess, implement, analyze, audit, and eventually, report and 
disseminate. This challenge will affect how data collection is approached when 
CR is fully implemented. Likewise, determining tracking and follow-up periods 
post-pilot implementation, as well as file retention periods, will need to conform to 
current records management federal regulations. 
As discussed, implementing CR into the realm of immigration enforcement 
policy will be challenging and risky. Success will necessitate strong leadership, 
bi-partisan support, and consistency in the manner in which it is applied across 
the nation, which is essential to overcome underlying assumptions surrounding 
its use as a “soft approach to criminal immigration recidivism.” 
H. POSSIBLE STAKEHOLDER OBJECTIONS: MODEL TRADEOFFS 
1. The Public 
The taxpayers—whom CR aims to protect—as well as some members of 
the nation’s legislative bodies, are likely to oppose the implementation of CR as 
an enforcement tool against criminal immigration recidivists. The idea of not 
“punishing” repeat criminal immigration offenders with a period of incarceration 
may be seen as a risk to public safety, as incentive to others to offend or re-
offend, and as government bias and show of favoritism for criminal non-citizens. 
In other words, opponents will probably claim that unlike criminal recidivists who 
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are incarcerated, sometimes obtaining life sentences for their offenses,148 
criminal non-citizens will get a “free pass” by avoiding prison. 
2. DHS Law Enforcement Personnel 
Strong opposition will also likely derive from DHS enforcement personnel 
responsible for removal operations. CR will eliminate the need for officers to 
escort the criminal immigration recidivist to the country of origin. Criminal escort 
duties are one of the most satisfying aspects of immigration enforcement (after 
arrest and apprehension) because it represents finality and closure; the non-
citizen is no longer a homeland security threat. CR will be seen as another 
hindrance to effective enforcement,149 and as disruptive to organizational culture. 
DHS staff will likely oppose CR on the grounds of its lack of current use as 
an enforcement strategy. That is, law enforcement personnel will argue that the 
reason restitution is underused in the criminal justice system because it does not 
serve any deterrent or preventive purposes. 
3. Detention Facilities 
The prison industry will certainly oppose the implementation of CR as an 
enforcement tool in immigration enforcement. DHS150 is tasked with ensuring the 
safe and effective custody management for more than 30,000 undocumented 
148 A New York Times article, titled “Number of Life Terms Hit Record,” describes how the 
large number of criminal recidivists sentenced to life terms is impacting the prison system: “More 
prisoners today are serving life terms than ever before—140,610 out of 2.3 million inmates being 
held in jails and prisons across the country—under tough mandatory minimum-sentencing laws 
and the declining use of parole for eligible convicts.” Solomon Moore, “Number of Life Terms Hits 
Records, New York Times, July 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/23sentence. 
html?pagewanted=all. 
149 The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival process (DACA) or the Development, Relief, 
and Education for Alien Minors DREAM Act are examples of recent controversial immigration 
legislation. 
150 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 
2135. U.S. Government Printing Office, “Public Law 107-296,—NOV. 25, 2002,” November 08, 
2012, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ296/pdf/PLAW-107publ296.pdf. For an 
overview of ICE/ERO functions, see U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement 
and Removal Operations, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, “Enforcement and Removal Operations,” August 23, 2012, http://www.ice.gov/ 
about/offices/enforcement-removal-operations/. 
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persons in custody each day in DHS-owned, dedicated, and contracted detention 
facilities across the United States.151 Currently, DHS houses detainees in more 
than 250 for-profit local and state facilities. Nearly 67 percent of the detained 
population are housed in local or state facilities, 17 percent are housed in 
contract detention facilities (exclusively used for immigration detention), 13 
percent are housed in DHS-owned facilities (service processing centers or 
SPCs), and three percent are housed in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facilities, which 
are funded either through congressional appropriations to the bureau or through 
DHS reimbursement.152  
According to a report issued by the Detention Watch Network, facilities 
operated by private prison companies (for-profit) currently house nearly 50 
percent of the more than 30,000 immigrants detained by DHS at any given 
time.153 In a report criticizing DHS expenses on immigration detention, the 
National Immigration Forum (NIF) argued, “if DHS limited its use of detention to 
individuals who have committed violent crimes, the agency could save nearly 
$4.4 million a night or $1.6 billion annually—an 82 percent reduction in costs.154 
4. NGOs 
Pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant organizations may oppose 
implementation of CR, but for disparate motives. Pro-immigration organizations, 
such as Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch; the American Civil 
Liberties Union, and others, will view CR as a government abuse of power, and 
151 Based on FY 2011 statistics. For a description of ICE/ERO detention management 
functions, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, “Fact Sheet: A Day in the Life of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations,” 
February 23, 2013, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf/day-in-life-ero.pdf. 
152 As described by ICE. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ICE, “Fact Sheet: 
Detention Management,” November 10 2011, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/ 
detention-mgmt.htm. 
153 Detention Watch Network, “The Influence of the Private Prison Industry in the 
Immigration Detention Business,” May 2011, http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/ 
sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/PrivatePrisonPDF-FINAL%205-11-11.pdf. 
154 National Immigration Forum, “The Math of Immigration Detention: Runaway Costs for 
Immigration Detention do Not Add Up to Sensible Policies,” 8. 
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will argue that CR is a civil rights violation against criminal immigration recidivists, 
as well as an unjust practice. The argument will be based mainly on the target 
population’s presumed lack of financial resources, and the organizations’ view 
that the least the government can do for this population is to ensure their safe 
return to the country of origin, particularly, since it was the government that failed 
to prevent their re-entry in the first place.  
In short, since the government failed to protect Americans against these 
individuals, the government should not expect these persons to reimburse it for 
the lack of effective preventive measures. However, the average citizen may 
disagree with these arguments; the government should not be made responsible 
for the choices a non-citizen makes when deciding to re-enter the United States 
after removal without authorization. 
Pro-immigrant organizations will also bring about legal arguments against 
the implementation of CR. Restitution is a victim-oriented intervention, imposed 
by the court during a criminal or civil procedure as per the MVRA. As such, CR 
has no place in the immigration enforcement system. Delineated offenses have 
been determined for which restitution applies, and illegal re-entry by previously 
deported criminal non-citizens is not one of them, a strong counter-argument. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that CR is only modeled after 
restitution’s theoretical foundations. CR is not the same (nor is to be applied in 
the same manner) as current restitution programs. 
Pro-immigrant organizations will also argue against CR from a geopolitical 
or economic perspective; that of requiring third-world poor immigrants or their 
families (regardless of criminal background) to pay CR to a wealthy nation—such 
as the United States, is tantamount to slavery, and therefore, unacceptable.155 In 
some way or another, CR will inevitably affect innocent, non-criminal family 
members, since it will force them to pay on behalf of their detained relatives.156 
155 Emphasis added; Comments by Dr. Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez on original CR implementation 
manuscript. Cited with his authorization; email communication dated January 16, 2014. 
156 Ibid. 
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However, pro-immigrant organizations should utilize CR indigence claims 
to assist individuals in obtaining funding to avoid prosecution and further 
detention. Although the priority for many (if not all) non-profit pro-immigrant 
organizations, NGOs, law firms, and academic law clinics have historically been 
asylum seekers, children, women, human trafficking victims, non-criminal and 
non-violent immigrants, among other cases, CR may lead to the development of 
a new criteria for assistance. The author realizes, however, that this suggestion 
may not be well received. These groups and organizations have limited 
resources, which are used to assist other “more qualified” clients (such as 
asylum seekers, human trafficking victims, etc.) than criminal immigration 
recidivists. Extra resources to assist criminal immigration recidivists with funding 
may not be available. 
On the other hand, anti-immigrant organizations, such as the Federation 
for American Immigration Reform, the Center for Immigration Studies, etc., will 
argue that CR will lead to an even more dysfunctional immigration enforcement 
system, and thus, result in additional enforcement expenses. The argument will 
center on CR’s logic as an enforcement tool. That is, these groups will claim that 
criminal immigration recidivists will rather take a gamble, and allow DHS to 
attempt prosecution than sign a CR agreement; chances are that prosecution will 
be declined, or the length of sentence minimal (if at all imposed). Therefore, why 
would they want to rush removal, and on top of that, lose their money on CR?  
Anti-immigrant groups will further argue that criminal immigration 
recidivists will do whatever is necessary to remain in the United States, even if in 
prison, rather than be returned to their countries of origin, especially if the return 
is at their own expense. 
These groups will also counter that CR is an alternative to prison that will 
encourage recidivism. Alternative programs, such as CR, have no strategic 
benefit within immigration enforcement; only imprisonment will serve to punish 
and deter criminal immigration recidivists for violating U.S. laws, and threatening 
American communities. 
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5. International Carriers 
The transportation industry will likely oppose CR’s implementation within 
immigration enforcement as well. The argument will center on security concerns. 
DHS law enforcement personnel escort criminal non-citizens via commercial 
carriers157 to the country of origin, and the number of offenders allowed per trip is 
restricted.158 Currently, commercial carriers are notified of any escorted removals 
in advance.159 CR will eliminate these procedures, as the criminal immigration 
recidivist will be traveling just like any other fare-paying customer. Thus, the 
industry—supported by DHS enforcement staff and the taxpayers—will argue 
that CR will jeopardize the safety of the traveling public.  
An alternative will be not to notify transportation carriers at all of the 
criminal immigration recidivists’ travel. Doing so, however, will not only be 
considered dangerous to the safety of the traveling public, but also unethical, and 
will run contrary to regulations, and the transparency model espoused by DHS.  
On the other hand, once released, many convicted criminals—more 
dangerous or as dangerous as criminal immigration recidivists—travel freely 
without any advanced notifications to transportation carriers. The same argument 
can be made about CR’s target population. Nonetheless, it is another challenge 
to CR implementation, and one that, depending on the program’s final outcomes, 
may be difficult to justify. 
Transportation carriers, as well as DHS enforcement staff responsible for 
escorted removals, will further argue that unexpected events, such as emergency 
landings or weather-related complications, will serve to provide CR recipients 
with the opportunity to abscond. However, if properly coordinated between DHS 
and the transportation carriers, DHS staff at the detour site can provide coverage 
157 DHS threat assessment policy and classification level determines the person’s need for 
an escort. In other words, not all criminal removals are escorted, and not all escorted persons are 
criminals. 
158 Restrictions are carrier-specific. 
159 Advanced notification requirements and times vary among carriers.  
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to prevent the individual from absconding. The risk of utilizing this alterative is 
that if the detour occurs outside the United States (i.e., during temporary stops or 
plane changes, etc.), and the individual absconds on international territory on 
which the United States has no jurisdiction, then the CR strategy can turn into a 
foreign policy issue. Nevertheless, DHS can always collaborate with the host 
country, and provide any necessary information regarding the fugitive—even 
assist in search efforts. 
Another alternative may appear more appealing to the transportation 
industry (in part), and to DHS enforcement staff. DHS can avoid the use of 
commercial transportation carriers, unless unavoidable or not cost-effective, and 
instead use DHS Air Operations160 to conduct CR removal cases during the pilot 
period. DHS can set a fixed monetary amount—depending on its current 
expenses to the country of destination, and other transportation and detention 
expenses—and weigh the advantages and disadvantages of utilizing this 
approach.  
6. Legitimate and Clandestine Agendas  
a. Foreign Governments 
CR will certainly affect the legitimate and clandestine agendas of certain 
groups or parties involved in or influenced by immigration enforcement. For 
instance, foreign governments will oppose CR for two main reasons, 1) the 
impact on their country’s economies due to the loss of revenue from remittance 
flows,161 and 2) the sudden influx of criminal citizens into their societies.  
160 See Written Testimony of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Executive 
Associate Director Thomas Homan for a House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, Subcommittee on National Security Hearing Titled “Border Security Oversight: Identifying 
and Responding to Current Threats. 
161 Ralph Chami, Connel Fullenkamp, and Samir Jahjah, Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a 
Source of Capital for Development (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003). 
 90 
                                            
These governments will likely claim that they do not have the 
infrastructure or the resources to manage more “sophisticated U.S.-trained” 
convicted criminals.  
b. Immigration Attorneys 
Immigration attorneys as well will perceive CR as a business challenge. 
They will argue that the target population will forgo legal representation in lieu of 
CR—thus jeopardizing their due process rights. As a result, CR will encourage 
DHS staff to violate criminal immigration recidivists’ civil rights. However, the 
author disagrees with this argument. Immigration attorneys should use CR as an 
opportunity to help their clients understand the intent of the policy, and the 
benefits to both the offender and the government. 
In addition, immigration attorneys will argue that the target population will 
not retain legal counsel (an extra expense), when it would rather use available 
funds to accept and fulfill a CR agreement.  
c. Criminal Organizations/Enterprises 
Depending on how CR’s intended purpose is received among criminal 
organizations, it can affect their agendas as well. Criminal immigration recidivists 
are a “commodity” to criminal enterprises. Losing this commodity to prison—due 
to prosecution for illegal re-entry after removal—is an inconvenience. CR will 
allow the criminal immigration recidivist to leave the United States, and continue 
to provide its services to the criminal outfit from a new location.  
Of critical concern, however, is the potential for these organizations to 
create a source of revenue at the expense of CR recipients. Criminal 
organizations may use CR debts to create a type of “indenture slavery” program; 
that is, as a condition to facilitate CR payments to offenders (or their family 
members). These organizations may end up demanding forced labor, human and 
sex trafficking, kidnappings, and other types of criminal activities. 
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Of course, while not all the possible opposing views, they represent the 
primary stakeholders’ potential arguments against the implementation of CR as 
an enforcement tool against criminal immigration recidivism. The answers to 
some of these arguments will remain unknown until CR is piloted. CR’s 
acceptance, adaptability, functionality, effectiveness, arguments pro and con, 
operational efficiency, tradeoffs, necessary adjustments, and other issues 
addressed in this document, will remain unknown until the new strategy is 
deployed and tested.  
Nevertheless, implementing and piloting CR needs to start immediately 
while the current administration is heavily involved in reforming the immigration 
system. The opportunity for CR implementation is now. The sooner CR is 
implemented; the sooner outcomes can be measured. 
The upcoming section, Chapter V, concludes this thesis project. The 
chapter summarizes the research findings, CR’s implementation main goals, pros 
cons, and implications for homeland security. It closes by suggesting further 
areas of research in the area of recidivism and immigration enforcement.  
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V. FUTURE OUTLOOK 
This project focused on researching the answers to the following 
questions.  
• In general, what is restitution’s utility for the criminal justice system?  
• Given the similarities between the criminal justice and immigration 
enforcement systems, to what extent is the addition of a CR policy 
model to Mission 3’s “prevention of unlawful immigration” goals and 
objectives feasible? 
• Assuming that adding a CR policy model to Mission 3 is feasible, 
what strategic recommendations or core factor modifications would 
be required to develop and implement it? 
The thesis validated several assumptions regarding the development and 
implementation of a CR policy model within Mission 3: (1) that it was feasible to 
implement within the immigration enforcement system, (2) that it would shift the 
costs of repeat enforcement from the taxpayers to the recidivists, thereby, 
serving to self-sustain Mission 3’s goals and objectives, and, (3) that as a result 
of transferring the costs of reinitiating the removal process from DHS to the 
recidivists, CR’s outcomes would result in lower rates of criminal immigration 
recidivism.  
Introducing a CR policy model, as part of Mission 3’s “prevention of 
unlawful immigration” goals and objectives is feasible due to the similarities—in 
terms of processes—between the criminal and immigration enforcement 
systems. As proposed in this thesis, restitution would continue to benefit the 
“victim” (i.e., the taxpayer); it will also open the door for research in this area of 
alternative sanctions and recidivism, but within criminal immigration recidivist 
populations.  
Based on restitution’s conceptual foundations, feasibility, and the 
proposed implications of its introduction, the author developed the concept of CR 
to recommend a strategic initiative against criminal immigration recidivism—
thereby, answering research question number three. The implementation plan 
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detailed the steps to follow, including the recommendation of a pilot program to 
test the strategy.  
The CR implementation plan considers the advantages, disadvantages (or 
risks), caveats, challenges, possible supporters and detractors. The author’s goal 
was to offer objective recommendations on how to overcome opposition to CR 
implementation.  
The next section details the implications of implementing a CR strategic 
scheme against criminal immigration recidivists within Mission 3. 
A. IMPLICATIONS 
The main difference successful CR implementation would make is to shift 
the fiscal burden of reinforcement from the taxpayer to the recidivist. The 
success of this intervention will be determined by factors, such as the long-term 
financial impact brought upon the criminal immigration recidivist, the 
accompanying psychological effects towards desistance, and the offenders’ 
ability, willingness, and desire to comply with the CR agreement in lieu of risking 
prosecution.  
A CR pilot program should be implemented for no less than two years, 
and as previously suggested, should begin with the non-violent criminal 
immigration recidivists as the primary target population to aid the adaptation to 
this somewhat radical method of enforcement.  
The two-year period calculation is estimated to provide enough data to 
assess CR’s applicability and effectiveness, and allow for iterations accordingly. 
The 1975 Georgia’s Restitution Center Program, and the 1977 Georgia’s Non-
Residential Sole Sanction Restitution Program162 could serve as comprehensive 
blueprints on how to make adjustments during the pilot program.  
162 For a description of this program, see Bill Read, Restitution As it Meets Public 
Expectations in Georgia’s Restitution Programs (Atlanta, GA: American Correctional Association 
Congress, 1977), Office of Justice Programs, National Criminal Justice Reference Service: NCJ 
045621, May 18, 2013, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/45621NCJRS.pdf. 
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If the pilot period is a success, and preliminary data shows CR’s 
effectiveness as a tool against criminal immigration recidivism, the next challenge 
will be to implement it across the other category of criminal immigration 
recidivists (i.e., the violent population). Whether to impose it as a one-time 
option, in addition to in lieu of prosecution, or more than once, will have to be 
decided based on metrics’ results. It is in this area in which leadership, advocacy, 
bi-partisan collaboration, and the nation’s risk-tolerance will be really put to the 
test. Implementing CR within the violent criminal immigration recidivist population 
will not only challenge traditional enforcement strategies, but also its failure or 
success will serve to re-focus Mission 3’s “prevention of unlawful immigration” 
goals and objectives. 
Although notable differences exist, the similarities and inter-relationship 
between the criminal justice and immigration enforcement systems are 
undeniable. The latter strives to be known as a “civil system,” which is completely 
unrelated to the former. Immigration enforcement handles the administrative side 
of immigration law (removals) as opposed to the criminal side, which is enforced 
by DOJ (prosecutions). Implementing an alternative sanction, such as CR within 
the immigration enforcement system, will be another step in further separating 
the two systems, and thus, achieving this distinction.  
Restitution is underutilized in the criminal justice system. CR will represent 
an innovative enforcement strategy within the immigration enforcement system 
based on “old theory.” According to the NCJRS, “Despite the passage of federal 
and state legislation, restitution remains one of the most under enforced and 
underused alternative sanction [emphasis added]. Evidence of this is apparent 
both in decisions to order restitution and in efforts to monitor, collect, and 
disperse restitution payments…”163  
163 The National Criminal Justice Reference Service, “New Directions from the Field: 
Restitution,” Chapter 15 (archives), January 29, 2013, https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/ 
directions/pdftxt/chap15.txt. 
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The pilot program’s main outcome measures may be surprising across all 
spectrums; for example, using recidivism rates as one of the main measures of 
success could be misleading because tracking procedures may affect CR’s 
outcomes. That is, currently, non-citizens are not tracked after removal. As CR 
will require tracking, the process will inevitably affect the overall impact of the 
strategy on the results.  
Based on the pilot’s outcomes, deciding to re-grant CR, and if so, how 
many times before attempting prosecution, may be challenging; thus, 
perpetuating the status quo. Similarly, CR will require that DHS and policymakers 
reconsider the current priority given to criminal immigration recidivists; after all, 
they are a special population, and managing it requires innovative approaches, 
whether such are already authorized under existing law or need to be. If, on the 
other hand, at this moment, criminal immigration recidivism is not as critical to 
national security as other priorities, CR should still be tested to show DHS’ 
proactive efforts to develop and implement fiscally conscientious strategies in 
times of economic austerity. 
The upcoming section offers suggestions on a future area of research 
related to immigration enforcement and recidivism. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Terrorists and Immigration Recidivism 
For the purposes of charging removal offenses, alien terrorists are listed 
as a separate category from criminal aliens. The INA,164 as amended, Section 
237 (a) (4) (B), General Classes of Deportable Aliens, Security and Related 
Grounds, refers to Section 212 (a) (3) (B) and (F) for a list of what constitute 
terrorist activities, and for a definition of terrorist representatives, and terrorist 
organizations. However, a definition of who is an alien terrorist is not provided. 
164 INA § 237 (a) (4) (B). 
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Although categorized separately and distinct from each other under the 
INA, criminal and terrorist aliens fall under the same priority category for 
immigration enforcement (the highest in priority 1). Alien terrorists’ removals do 
not appear to be counted as a separate category, but appear to be cited within 
criminal removal numbers. As a result, the rate of recidivism among previously 
removed alien terrorists in comparison to that of criminal immigration recidivists is 
unknown.  
One of the USAOs’ strategic goals is to “prevent terrorism and enforce the 
rule of law.” Toward this end, DOJ requested USD$ 52,788,000 in FY 2013 to 
prosecute terrorists; the author assumes citizenship status is irrelevant towards 
achieving this goal. The critical issue to consider is the reoffending rates of non-
citizens removed due to a terrorism conviction. Assuming that not all terrorists 
are convicted to life in prison, not all are U.S. citizens, and that at some point, 
most are removed upon completion of any criminal sentence for terrorism, why is 
it uncommon to read or hear about a “re-apprehended terrorist who was 
previously removed?”  
2. Interventions 
Incidence or precedent of recidivism among previously removed terrorists 
is unknown. This lack of data may be due to the manner in which DHS accounts 
for these particular removals. As the author previously mentioned, terrorists and 
criminal non-citizens are included in the same priority category. 
Another possibility may be that prosecutions and removals have a 
deterrent effect among previously removed non-citizen terrorists not seen within 
the criminal immigration recidivist population. 
Another possibility may be that interventions to reduce or eliminate 
recidivism among previously removed alien terrorists are classified, although this 
research did not uncover evidence of such practice.  
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Yet, another possibility may be that interventions against this population—
whether secret or not—are so effective that illegal immigration recidivism ceases 
after removal. 
Further research should explore whether the lack of research on this 
subject is due to lack of interest in the area, a matter of data access, collection, 
or privacy issues, or a matter of choosing to harden one target over another 
based on case-by-case risks assessments.  
Moreover, further research in this area will serve to explore this subject-
matter area better. Finding out if a recidivism problem exists within this 
population will be significant, as it will encourage an interest in further research 
and comparisons between this and the criminal immigration recidivists 
populations; similarly, finding out the lack of a problem will also be significant, as 
it will uncover strategic best practices that may be replicated in other offender 
categories. 
3. Conclusion 
CR is not a benefit or relief from removal, and must be understood in this 
manner. CR in no way provides impunity to criminal immigration recidivists. The 
best way to understand CR’s foundations is to interpret it as a form of 
prosecutorial discretion, but with a focus on “benefiting” the American taxpayer, 
not on “rewarding” the offender. CR is an enforcement strategy geared towards 
desistance of criminal immigration recidivism from a financial accountability, 
rather than from a pure “punitive” perspective.  
CR’s goal is to apply an unconventional management approach to a 
persistent threat, i.e., criminal immigration recidivism.  
CR strikes a balance between the need for urgency to tend to this matter, 
and the need for well developed, and ethical strategies. The CR strategy is 
meant to strengthen Mission 3’s “prevention of unlawful immigration” goals and 
objectives; thus, furthering DHS homeland security principles.  
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES ELIGIBLE FOR 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTION 
 
Table 12.   List of Criminal Offenses Eligible for Immigration 
Enforcement Action165 
165 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information 
Services (CJIS) Division, “National Crime Information Center (NCIC),” December 12, 2013, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm. The FBI describes NCIC as “A computerized 
index of criminal justice information (i.e.- criminal record history information, fugitives, stolen 
properties, missing persons). It is available to Federal, state, and local law enforcement and other 
criminal justice agencies and is operational 24 hours a day, 365 days a year; the purpose for 
maintaining the NCIC system is to provide a computerized database for ready access by a 
criminal justice agency making an inquiry, and for prompt disclosure of information in the system 
from other criminal justice agencies about crimes and criminals. This information assists 
authorized agencies in criminal justice and related law enforcement objectives, such as 
apprehending fugitives, locating missing persons, locating and returning stolen property, as well 
as in the protection of the law enforcement officers encountering the individuals described in the 
system.”  
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APPENDIX B. DEFINITION OF KEY IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT TERMS 
These definitions can be found in various sources.166 
 
Border removal: An individual removed by ICE who is apprehended while 
attempting to illicitly enter the United States at or between the ports of entry by a 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)167 officer or agent. These individuals are 
also referred to as “recent border crossers.” 
 
Criminal alien: An individual convicted in the United States for one or more 
criminal offenses. This does not include civil traffic offenses.  
 
Criminal immigration offense: A violation of federal criminal immigration law 
under Title 8 or Title 18 of the U.S. Code. The most common such violations for 
which aliens are convicted are 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (re-entry of a deported alien), 8 
U.S.C. § 1324 (bringing in and harboring certain aliens), 15 U.S.C. § 1546 (fraud 
and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents), and 8 U.S.C.§ 1325 (entry 
of alien at improper time or place). 
 
Detention: The seizure and incarceration of an alien in order to hold him/her 
while awaiting judicial or legal proceedings or return transportation to his/her 
country of citizenship. 
 
Inadmissible alien: An alien seeking admission into the United States who is 
ineligible to be admitted according to the provisions of INA § 212.  
 
Immigration fugitives: An individual who has failed to leave the United States 
based upon a final order of removal, deportation or exclusion, or who has failed 




166 John F. Simanski and Lesley M. Sapp, “Immigration Enforcement Actions 2012, Box 1. 
Definitions of Immigration Enforcement Terms,” Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
Immigration Statistics, December 2013, 2, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_ 
enforcement_ar_2012_0.pdf; John F. Simanski and Lesley M. Sapp, “Immigration Enforcement 
Actions 2011,” Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, September 
2012, 2, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/enforcement_ 
ar_2011.pdf; Rosenblum and Kandel, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting 
Criminal Aliens. 
167 CBP is another agency within DHS. It includes Customs and Border Protection officers 
(i.e., at ports of entries, such as airports, seaports and land borders), and Border Patrol agents 
throughout the United States and its possessions. 
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Interior removal: An individual removed by ICE who is identified or 
apprehended in the United States by an ICE officer or agent. This category 
excludes those apprehended at the immediate border while attempting to 
unlawfully enter the United States. 
 
Other removable alien: An individual who is not confirmed to be a convicted 
criminal, recent border crosser or fall under another ICE civil enforcement priority 
category. This category may include individuals removed on national security 
grounds or for general immigration violations.  
 
Previously removed alien: An individual previously removed or returned who 
has re-entered the country illegally again. 
 
Reinstatement of final removal order: The removal of an alien based on the 
reinstatement of a prior removal order, where the alien departed the United 
States under an order of removal and illegally re-entered the United States [INA 
§ 241(a)(5)]. The alien may be removed without a hearing before an immigration 
court.  
 
Removal: The compulsory and confirmed movement of an inadmissible or 
deportable alien out of the United States based on an order of removal. An 
individual who is removed may have administrative or criminal consequences 
placed on subsequent re-entry owing to the fact of the removal. 
 
Return: The confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable alien out of 
the United States not based on an order of removal.  
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APPENDIX C. AMOUNT AND PERCENT OF OFFENDERS RECEIVING RESTITUTION AS A 
SOLE SANCTION OR IN COMBINATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
 
Table 13.   Amount and Percent of Offenders Receiving Restitution As a Sole Sanction or in Combination 
in U.S. District Court.184 
184 United States Sentencing Commission, “Offenders Receiving Fines and Restitution in Each Primary Offense Category U.S. 
Sentencing Commission’s 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics–Table 15 (Online),” June 14, 2013, 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/Table15.pdf. 
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